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Race, Genes, and Justice  
A CALL TO REFORM THE PRESENTATION OF FORENSIC 
DNA EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 
Jonathan Kahn† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
How and when, if at all, is it appropriate to use race1 in 
presenting forensic DNA evidence in a court of law? In October 2002, a 
California jury convicted William Curtis Wilson of “first degree murder 
with use of a dangerous weapon during commission of an attempted rape 
and a lewd act upon a child. The court sentenced him to a term of life in 
prison without possibility of parole.”2  DNA evidence played a central 
role in obtaining the conviction. This, in itself, is neither extraordinary 
nor unusual given the broad acceptance of the use of DNA evidence in 
courts across the country and, indeed, around the world.3 The case is 
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1
 I do not attempt to provide a set definition of “race” in this Article. Rather, I focus 
primarily on how actors in specific legal and scientific contexts have used the term. In the interests 
of economy and manageable syntax, in the remainder of this Article I will often refer only to “race” 
when speaking generally of racial and ethnic categories. I am assuming both to be socially 
constructed categories that nonetheless have come to have biological implications as they play out in 
real world biomedical and forensic contexts. I will use the terms “race” and/or “ethnic” when 
referring to specifically marked groups. Thus, for example, the U.S. Census codes “White” or 
“Asian” as racial categories and “Hispanic” or “Latino” as ethnic categories. U.S. Census Bureau, 
Racial and Ethnic Classifications Used in Census 2000 and Beyond, http://www.census.gov/population/ 
www/socdemo/race/racefactcb.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Racial and Ethnic 
Classifications]. In the context of forensic practice, Hispanic is also sometimes referred to as a racial 
group. See Madeleine J. Hinkes, Race, Ethnicity and Forensic Anthropology: Realities of Racial 
Determination in a Forensic Setting, 13 NAT’L ASS’N FOR PRAC. ANTHROPOLOGY BULL. 48, 49 
(1993) (“[O]ne’s social race or ‘ethnicity’ may not be the same as [one’s] biological race. For 
example, self-proclaimed ‘Hispanic’ individuals may be Spanish (Caucasoid), Mexican (American 
Indian), Puerto Rican (Negroid admixture), or Filipino (Asian Mongoloid).”). Ethnic groups are 
often also discussed as subgroups within races. For example, Italian or Irish might be understood as 
ethnic subgroups within the racial category of Caucasian.  
 
2
 People v. Wilson (Wilson I), 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 102, 106 & n.5 (Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 
136 P.3d 864 (Cal. 2006).  
 
3
 The literature on the development and current state of the use and acceptance of DNA 
for forensic purposes is extensive. Helpful resources for exploring some of these issues can be found 
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noteworthy, however, for its discussion of the appropriate use of racially 
identified forensic DNA databases in calculating the odds that DNA left 
at the scene of the crime by the perpetrator might be that of the 
defendant. The crime scene DNA was found to match the defendant 
Wilson’s DNA at nine distinct loci, or specific points on the genome.4  
The question then became what were the odds that someone else might 
share the defendant’s same genetic profile? Such odds are known as a 
Random Match Probability (RMP)—the probability of finding the same 
DNA profile identified in the crime scene sample in a randomly selected, 
unrelated individual.5   
The California Supreme Court noted that RMP calculations by 
Nicola Shea, a California Department of Justice criminologist,6 provided 
support for the conclusion that Wilson’s “genetic profile would be 
expected to occur in one of 96 billion Caucasians, one of 180 billion 
Hispanics, and one of 340 billion African-Americans” and that “these 
profiles were extremely rare; [after all,] the world contains only about six 
and a half to seven billion human beings.”7 On appeal to the California 
Court of Appeal, Wilson’s attorneys strenuously contested this use of 
race-specific DNA databases to calculate odds to assist the trier of fact in 
reaching a verdict.8 Invoking the 2003 Court of Appeal for the Fifth 
District decision in People v. Pizarro,9 they argued that the presentation 
of such race-specific odds was permissible only when the race of the 
perpetrator was known.10 Otherwise, they contended, the use of such 
evidence lacked sufficient evidentiary foundation because it was based 
on the improper assumption that the defendant was in fact the 
perpetrator.11 In July 2006, the California Supreme Court rejected this 
argument, finding that the introduction of evidence of the odds of a DNA 
match calculated using race-specific databases from major racial or 
  
at web sites maintained by the National Conference of State Legislatures and by the President’s 
DNA Initiative. See generally National Conference of State Legislatures, DNA in Criminal Justice 
(Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cj/dna.htm; The President’s DNA Initiative, 
Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology, http://www.dna.gov (last visited Sept. 22, 2008). For 
a brief history of the development and use of forensic DNA technologies, see JOHN M. BUTLER, 
FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF STR MARKERS 1-13 (2d ed. 
2005). 
 
4
 Wilson I, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 105, 114.  
 
5
 See BUTLER, supra note 3, at 481, 486-88. That the individual is “unrelated” is 
significant because related individuals will have a higher likelihood of sharing a greater percentage 
of DNA, hence altering the probabilities of a random match. See id.  
 
6
 People v. Wilson (Wilson II), 136 P.3d 864, 866 (Cal. 2006). 
 
7
 Id. at 867. 
 
8
  Wilson I, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 106.  
 
9
 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 21 (Ct. App. 2003), disapproved by People v. Wilson, 136 P.3d 864 
(Cal. 2006). 
 
10
 See Appellant’s Opening Brief on the Merits at 25-26, People v. Wilson, 136 P.3d 864 
(Cal. 2006) (No. S130157).  
 
11
 Id. at 24; see also Wilson II, 136 P.3d at 867, 872. 
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ethnic groups represented in the local population was acceptable—
thereby effectively overturning the recent ruling in Pizarro.12 
Paired together, the holdings in Pizarro and Wilson provide a 
relatively bounded and focused site for the examination of debates 
relating to the use of racialized databases in forensic DNA analysis.13 
Pizarro involved an appeal from a case originally tried in 1990, when 
forensic DNA testing was still in its infancy. At the original trial, the 
forensic expert for the state testified that the odds of the defendant’s 
genetic profile occurring in other population groups ranged from one in 
250,000 in “Hispanics” up to one in 10,000,000 in “Caucasians”14 
(frequencies in other racial populations were not presented to the jury).15 
Here, the difference produced by using racially marked databases may be 
significant—not only statistically, but also as a legal matter. The lower 
denominators in this situation may be understood in large part as a 
function of the more rudimentary techniques for DNA analysis at the end 
of the 1980s.16 Race seemed relevant because it appeared to refine the 
  
 
12
 Wilson II, 136 P.3d at 873. 
 
13
 At the outset, it is important to note that these questions are distinct from (yet 
ultimately related to) current heated debates concerning the use of DNA technologies to construct 
racial profiles of potential suspects from DNA samples left by an unknown perpetrator at the scene 
of a crime. See generally Frederick R. Bieber, Science and Technology of Forensic DNA Profiling: 
Current Use and Future Directions, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE 
TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 23 (David Lazer ed., 2004); Pilar N. Ossorio, About Face: Forensic 
Genetic Testing for Race and Visible Traits, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 277, 281-83 (2006). Such 
technology is largely prospective, being used in law enforcement contexts by investigating police 
authorities. It uses race to aid in the apprehension of a possible suspect. See Bieber, in DNA AND 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE, supra, at 36-38. In contrast, the use 
of race-specific databases at trial is largely retrospective. It is used by prosecutors to link an already 
apprehended suspect back to the crime by matching his or her DNA to a sample found at the crime 
scene. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Relative Priority that Should Be Assigned to Trial Stage 
DNA Issues, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE, supra, at 
91, 97-100. The basic technology used is also often different. As discussed further below, courtroom 
uses of DNA involve constructing statistical probabilities for matches between two existing samples 
of DNA—the defendant’s and the crime scene sample. See infra Parts II.A-B. Racial profiling for 
unsolved crimes generally involves examining a crime scene DNA sample for “Ancestry Informative 
Markers” (AIMS), which (though highly controversial) are believed by some scientists to provide 
indications of the likely ancestry, or mixture of ancestries, of the human source of the sample. See, 
e.g., Mark Shriver et al., Commentary, Getting the Science and the Ethics Right in Forensic 
Genetics, 37 NATURE GENETICS 449, 449-50 (2005). For a critique of this technology in the forensic 
context, see generally Mildred K. Cho & Pamela Sankar, Commentary, Forensic Genetics and 
Ethical, Legal and Social Implications Beyond the Clinic, 36 NATURE GENETICS S8 (2004) 
[hereinafter Forensic Genetics]; Mildred K. Cho & Pamela Sankar, Response, Getting the Science 
and the Ethics Right in Forensic Genetics, 37 NATURE GENETICS 450, 450-51 (2005). These 
technologies and their forensic uses, though in many respects different, do share a common 
propensity to reify race as genetic. Such a propensity is socially dangerous and threatens to recreate 
or revitalize stigmatized conceptions of biologically superior and inferior races. See, e.g., Troy 
Duster, Race and Reification in Science, 307 SCIENCE 1050, 1050-51 (2005); Sandra Soo-Jin Lee et 
al., The Meaning of “Race” in the New Genomics: Implications for Health Disparities Research, 1 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 33 passim (2001). Such a propensity is also scientifically 
suspect, is based on highly problematic assumptions about the correlations between race and 
biological ancestry, and disregards current, broadly held understandings of the incoherence of race 
as a genetic concept. See infra notes 122-127 and accompanying text; see also infra Part V.B.  
 
14
 Pizzaro, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 97-98. 
 
15
 Id. at 104 n.81. 
 
16
 See BUTLER, supra note 3, at 2-6.  
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results of a newly developing and still relatively crude technology. 
Hence, race became instantiated at the outset of forensic DNA analysis 
as a basic framework for presenting data. By the time of Wilson’s case, 
however, the technology had developed to such an extent that it was 
regularly capable of producing odds ratios on the order of one in the 
hundreds of billions.17 With such odds, the practical utility of 
distinguishing RMPs by race disappears. Nonetheless, race has remained 
ingrained in the framework of the production and interpretation of 
forensic DNA evidence.18  
This Article considers how relations between science and law 
must continually be reevaluated in light of changing social and 
technological developments. It questions the underlying assumption of 
the utility of race itself in forensic DNA analysis. Beginning with a 
review of the development of forensic DNA technology, it examines 
what race adds as a practical matter to the ability of a finder of fact to 
make fair and accurate decisions. Any such value must then be weighed 
against the potential dangers of bias created by introducing issues of race 
as genetic into the context of what is usually a violent crime. The Article 
argues that in most cases such evidence should be excluded as irrelevant 
or that, if deemed relevant, it should be held inadmissible because the 
dangers of infecting the proceedings with racial prejudice outweigh any 
possible benefit that introducing the race-based statistics could provide. 
This is not necessarily because the mere mention of race will inevitably 
taint a jury’s deliberations, but rather because the benefits of using race 
in such a context must be deemed so de minimis as to be incapable of 
outweighing even a remote danger of racial prejudice. Moreover, when 
examining the implications of connecting race and genetics in the context 
of violent crime, this Article will consider that oftentimes such a danger 
may be far from remote. The Article concludes that in most cases, given 
the current state of forensic DNA technology, there is no longer any 
justification (if there ever was any) for using race-specific databases in 
presenting DNA evidence to a jury. Ironically, given the power of 
current technology to generate powerful RMPs, adopting the 
recommendation to abandon the use of race in the presentation of 
forensic DNA evidence would not materially affect the ability of 
prosecutors to obtain convictions based on DNA evidence. It would, 
however, transform the way in which race, genes, and violent crime are 
associated in the criminal justice system. 
The Article reaches this conclusion by first providing 
background, in Part II, to the history and technical aspects both of 
forensic DNA analysis and of debates regarding the relation between 
  
 
17
 See, e.g., id. at 8-10; Bruce Budowle et al., Source Attribution of a Forensic DNA 
Profile, 2 FORENSIC SCI. COMM., July 2000, available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july2000/ 
source.htm#Introduction. 
  
18
  See infra Parts IV.C-D. 
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race and genetics. This section begins by introducing some of the details 
of early forensic DNA practices and procedures. It also examines early 
debates over the appropriate use of racial categories in generating 
statistical match probabilities. In the early years of forensic DNA 
analysis, the late 1980s and early 1990s, these debates did not involve 
questions of whether to use race, but rather how much race to use. The 
concern of some early forensic DNA analysts was that using too broad a 
population group would generate odds of a match that were unfairly low. 
Advocates of using broad racial categories argued that such categories 
provided a pragmatic and useful means to generate more accurate 
statistics rather than using an undifferentiated general population 
database, while still providing odds that were fair to a defendant. Critics 
of this approach argued that since there is more genetic variation within 
racial groups than between them, databases should be characterized by 
smaller subgroups within the larger racial designation in order to provide 
even better information about RMPs. This Part of the Article also 
considers how these arguments relate to broader issues concerning the 
nature of race in relation to genetics.  This Part concludes with an 
examination of how the debates over using race to calculate RMPs were 
ultimately settled by the mid-1990s in favor of using broad racial 
categories, which then became the norm for forensic DNA practice in the 
United States.19 
Part III examines the current standards and protocols for 
conducting forensic DNA analysis and considers how, where, and when 
forensic experts inject race into their practices. This section begins with 
an examination of DNA databases, focusing on the FBI’s Combined 
DNA Index System (CODIS), which began as a pilot project in 1990 and 
has since evolved into a major database of over five million DNA 
profiles from convicted offenders nationwide.20 It reviews technological 
developments that have greatly increased the power and efficiency of 
forensic DNA analysis and considers the selection of thirteen genetic loci 
that have become the standard for generating DNA matches and 
calculating RMPs.21 
Part IV contrasts the elaboration and standardization of such 
technical protocols for DNA analysis with the protocols (or lack thereof) 
for producing and using racial and ethnic categories in forensic DNA 
analysis. Here, I argue that the use of racial categories is woefully under-
conceptualized and wholly inadequate—especially when contrasted with 
the great care taken to elaborate the technical protocols for DNA analysis 
itself.  I argue that similar care of the data should be given to methods for 
using racial categories in a genetic context. I put forward the use of 
general, non-racial reference population databases as the obvious 
  
  
19
  See infra Part II.C. 
 
20
 See infra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.  
 
21
  See infra text accompanying notes 145-153. 
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solution to this problem. This Part concludes with a recommendation that 
what I call the “inertial power of race” has remained in a system of 
practice and analysis long after the initial reasons for using it have faded. 
It considers, as well, some of the dangers, beyond the court room, of 
allowing race to persist in a context that inappropriately reifies it as 
genetic. 
Part V returns to People v. Wilson and related cases to examine 
the current state of how race is used in presenting forensic DNA data in 
courts of law. The focus here is primarily on developments in California 
case law as a case study that provides a particularly good site of analysis 
and raises issues that are relevant to understanding how racialized data is 
used in presenting DNA evidence in courts across the country. A close 
analysis of these cases provides a clear and factually specific context for 
understanding broader issues of how and why racialized genetic data is 
used in today’s criminal justice system. 
Part VI develops a specific critique of current uses of racialized 
DNA evidence and elaborates on (or expands) the argument that, in most 
cases, race-specific genetic data that is used to generate RMPs should not 
be admitted in court. This section begins with a brief consideration of the 
court’s gate-keeping function in evaluating scientific evidence under 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.22 Using the Federal Rules 
of Evidence (“FRE”) as a framework, it then considers the basic question 
of what race adds to RMPs generated through forensic DNA analysis. 
More specifically, given that it is possible, with current technology, to 
generate astronomically low RMPs without using race, it questions 
whether any legally relevant information of practical use to the finder of 
fact is added by introducing race into the calculation. The problem here 
is to consider whether such data passes the threshold for legal relevance 
in determining its admissibility. Here, I assert that courts must be careful 
to distinguish between statistical relevance and legal relevance in 
evaluating such evidence. I argue that in many situations the different 
RMPs produced by referencing distinct race-specific databases provide 
no useful additional information to the trier of fact and so should be 
excluded. I conclude that the only thing race adds to the proceedings is 
race itself. It associates race, genes, and violent crime in a manner 
wholly irrelevant to the determination of a particular defendant’s guilt or 
innocence. 
I then move on to argue that even if such evidence is deemed 
relevant, it should nonetheless be excluded as prejudicial. Here, I weigh 
any possible benefits to using race-specific RMPs in presenting evidence 
against the dangers of injecting the proceedings with unfounded 
associations of race, genes, and crime, which threaten to evoke attitudes 
among the jury that, even if unconscious, are improperly tainted with 
racism. In developing this section, I consider studies that examine the 
  
 
22
 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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particular psychology involved in presenting DNA evidence to a jury. 
Further, I bring that work into dialogue with studies on the psychology of 
implicit prejudice—tacit attitudes towards race that are often held 
without an individual’s own conscious awareness of how they influence 
his or her perceptions of and responses to racialized subjects. Together, 
the persuasive authority of DNA evidence and the reality of implicit 
prejudice call into question the legitimacy of using racialized DNA 
evidence.  
Concern over the prejudicial impact of such evidence gains 
added force when we situate those rather abstract psychological 
dynamics of implicit prejudice within the context of the highly racialized 
nature of the current or today’s United States’ criminal justice system. 
Here, I argue that the pervasive racialization of violent crime in the 
United States takes such concerns out of the realm of mere speculation 
and gives concrete cause for concern. Given the de minimis nature of any 
possible practical utility to be gained from introducing race-specific 
RMPs in most cases, I conclude that the prejudicial potential of such 
evidence clearly outweighs any possible benefits it might provide.  
The Article concludes with a brief synthesis of the arguments for 
ending the practice of using race to frame the presentation of forensic 
DNA evidence. It notes that this would not materially hinder the ability 
of prosecutors to obtain convictions using DNA evidence. Yet, by 
removing the gratuitous introduction of race into a context of genetics 
and violent crime, such reform would promote a positive and significant 
reorientation of the relation among race, genes, and justice. 
II.  RACE AND THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF FORENSIC DNA 
A.  Origins of Forensic DNA Testing 
DNA is made up of sequences of four nucleotides: adenine, 
cytosine, guanine, and thymine—commonly represented as A, C, G, and 
T.23 Each nucleotide base is paired through a process known as 
hybridization: A is always paired with T; C is always paired with G.24 
The human genome has roughly three billion of these “base pairs.”25 
There are two major steps in using DNA for purposes of forensic 
identification. First, a sample left at the crime scene by the perpetrator is 
compared to a sample from a suspect.26 Second, if there is a “match,” 
  
 
23
 National Human Genome Research Institute, A Brief Guide to Genomics, 
http://www.genome.gov/18016863 (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 
24
 Id.; National Human Genome Research Institute, Talking Glossary, 
http://www.genome.gov/glossary.cfm?key=hybridization (last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (defining 
hybridization). 
 
25
 BUTLER, supra note 3, at 20. For a helpful review of these general scientific concepts 
in a forensic context, see id. at 18-20. 
 
26
 David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, and the Courts, 7 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 101, 104 (1993).  
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then statistics must be used to calculate the frequency of that DNA 
“profile” in an appropriate reference population.27 This latter step is 
required because, although every person’s DNA is unique, it is 
impractical to compare the full three billion nucleotide base pairs of two 
samples for forensic purposes.28 Therefore, two samples will be 
compared only at a limited set (usually between four and thirteen) of 
“loci,” or specific parts of the genome.29 For this practice to be effective, 
it is necessary to find loci that are highly variable between individuals 
and test only for them.30 Humans, however, are essentially identical in 
about 99.5% of their DNA.31 Finding the specific points of variation 
among individuals, therefore, can be difficult.32 
In 1985, English geneticist Alec Jeffreys first described a method 
for developing a DNA “profile” of a person in a manner that might be 
used for purposes of forensic identification.33  Jeffreys’ innovation 
consisted of observing that, in particular regions of the human genome, 
short segments of DNA—the ACGT nucleotide sequence—are repeated 
between twenty and one hundred times.34 These regions of the genome 
are called “variable number of tandem repeats,” or VNTRs.35 Different 
numbers of these repeats compose VNTR “alleles,” which are also 
known as variations.36 In order to examine and visualize the VNTRs, 
Jeffreys employed a technique known as restriction fragment length 
polymorphism (RFLP), which involves cutting the DNA near the VNTRs 
with an enzyme.37 By looking at VNTRs from several distinct loci on the 
genome, it is possible to calculate the probability that a particular genetic 
profile comprised of distinct sets of VNTRs will appear in one or more 
individuals in a particular population.38 For example, “[a] standard way 
to estimate frequency [of a particular profile] is to count occurrences in a 
random sample of the appropriate population and then use classical 
statistical formulas to place upper and lower confidence limits on the 
  
 
27
 Id. 
 
28
 Forensic Genetics, supra note 13, at S9. 
 
29
 See BUTLER, supra note 3, at 2-6, 94. 
 
30
 Id. at 2-6. 
 
31
 Older analyses typically put the figure at 99.9%, but a more recent study indicates that 
99.5% may be a more accurate finding. See Rick Weiss, Mom’s Genes or Dad’s? Map Can Tell, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2007, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/03/AR2007090301106_2.html. 
 
32
 See BUTLER, supra note 3, at 2-6. 
 
33
 See generally Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable “Minisatellite” Regions in Human 
DNA, 314 NATURE 67 (1985); see also NAT’L COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, NAT’L 
INST. OF JUSTICE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 14-15 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183697.pdf 
[hereinafter FUTURE]. 
 
34
 BUTLER, supra note 3, at 2-3; R.C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics 
in Forensic DNA Typing, 254 SCIENCE 1745, 1745 (1991). 
 
35
 BUTLER, supra note 3, at 2-3. 
 
36
 Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 34, at 1745. 
 
37
 BUTLER, supra note 3, at 2-3. 
 
38
 Id. at 2-3, 623-24.  
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estimate.”39 The resulting “conclusion[] of identity or nonidentity 
between two samples [is therefore necessarily] probabilistic.”40 In 
conducting the comparison, investigators came to adopt the “product 
rule”41 for determining RMPs.42 Any given VNTR may be calculated to 
occur at a certain frequency in a random population.43 By the early 
1990s, the standard was to test for VNTRs at four independent loci on 
the genome.44 The product rule allows for multiplying each independent 
genotype frequency together to produce an overall probability of a match 
at all four loci.45 
Jeffreys’ innovation was first used in a forensic setting in 
England in 1986.46 Forensic DNA testing was first used in the United 
States in 1987.47 Shortly thereafter, commercial laboratories began 
practicing the “fingerprinting” procedure, and the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation began using forensic DNA techniques.48 Critical to the 
acceptance of forensic DNA in courts was the development of standards 
of technical proficiency and accuracy in generating RMPs.49 The product 
rule was one such standard, requiring that each chosen loci be understood 
as being inherited independently of the others.50 Also important were 
basic crime scene management techniques for the identification and 
handling of DNA samples.51 
  
 
39
 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 9 (1992) 
[hereinafter NRC I]. 
 
40
 Forensic Genetics, supra note 13, at S9; see also Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 34, at 
1745-46.  
 
41
 Richard Lempert defines the product rule as follows: 
According to the product rule, the probability of two independent events equals the 
probability of the first event times the probability of the second; with n independent 
events the separate probabilities of each of the n events are multiplied together to give the 
probability of their joint occurrence. Thus if the probability that a person had allele A = 
1/10 and the probability that he had allele B = 1/10 and the probability that he had allele 
C = 1/10, and if the probability that the person had one of these alleles was not affected 
by whether or not he had either or both of the others, the probability that the person 
would have alleles A, B, and C would be 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10, or 1/1000. 
Richard Lempert, The Suspect Population and DNA Identification, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 1 n.3 
(1993). 
 
42
 BUTLER, supra note 3, at 480-82, 485-86; Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 34, at 1746.  
 
43
 See Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 34, at 1746. 
 
44
 See BUTLER, supra note 3, at 2-3; Kaye, supra note 26, at 107. 
 
45
 See Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 34, at 1746.  
 
46
 BUTLER, supra note 3, at 3. 
 
47
 Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special Needs Search Under 
the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
165, 165 (2006). 
 
48
 FUTURE, supra note 33, at 15. 
 
49
 See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 41, at 1-3; Forensic Genetics, supra note 13, at S9.  
 
50
 See Lempert, supra note 41, at 1; see also D. H. Kaye, Logical Relevance: Problems 
with the Reference Population and DNA Mixtures in People v. Pizarro, 3 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 
211, 211-15 (2004) [hereinafter Logical Relevance]. 
 
51
 This latter area of concern was brought front and center in 1995 in the highly 
publicized murder trial of O. J. Simpson, where defense lawyers undermined apparently airtight 
evidence connecting Simpson to the crime by calling into question the methods (or lack thereof) 
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B.  Early Questions and Challenges: DNA Evidence and Race 
Debated in the Courtroom, National Studies, and Scholarly 
Journals 
Questions about the reliability of DNA evidence surfaced as 
early as 1989 in cases such as People v. Castro52 in New York and State 
v. Schwartz53 in Minnesota. Partially in response to these cases, several 
federal agencies urged the National Research Council (NRC) of the 
National Academies of Science (NAS) to study and recommend 
guidelines for the production and use of DNA evidence.54 The NRC 
created a Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science, which 
issued a report in 1992.55 It is in the context of the production of this 
report that race first enters the story front and center.  
The Committee covered an array of issues relating to the forensic 
use of DNA technologies.56 Among its most controversial findings were 
those relating to reference populations and the appropriate methodology 
for calculating RMPs.57 In order to calculate the odds of any particular 
VNTR allele appearing at a given locus on the genome, one must have an 
appropriate reference population.58 The product rule depends on the 
assumption of statistical independence of the alleles tested—that is, that 
they do not tend to occur in groups.59  
Generally speaking, the more “related” a person is to a particular 
population group, the higher the odds are of finding shared alleles—or, 
alternatively stated, the less independence there is among alleles.60 
Siblings would likely share more DNA than cousins; cousins more than 
others in the same isolated village; members of the same isolated village 
more than others in the same region; and so forth. Higher odds favor a 
suspect or defendant because they indicate a greater likelihood that some 
other person may have left the DNA sample found at a particular crime 
scene.61 The choice of reference population, therefore, can play a critical 
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role in shaping the weight and authority of DNA evidence.62 The choice, 
however, is not always straightforward. Indeed, some of the earliest and 
most contentious controversies involving the use of DNA technology in 
forensic science involved choosing the appropriate population against 
which a suspect’s DNA should be compared and defining just how the 
suspect may be “related” to this population.63 Concepts of race played a 
central role in these debates and continue to frame the way forensic 
scientists, law enforcement, and the bar produce and interpret DNA 
evidence to this day.64  
The basic issue is whether or to what extent racial or ethnic 
categories should be used to characterize reference populations against 
which particular DNA samples could be compared to generate RMPs. 
The use of such categories may be particularly problematic in the arena 
of forensic DNA analysis because racial groups, especially those 
delineated in the U.S. Census, are fundamentally social, not biological, 
categories.65 Indeed, at least since the 1970s scientists have understood 
that race will statistically explain only a small portion of genetic 
variations.66 As a recent editorial in Nature Genetics put it, “scientists 
have long been saying that at the genetic level there is more variation 
between two individuals in the same population than between 
populations and that there is no biological basis for ‘race.’”67 
Nonetheless, to the extent that certain population geneticists understand 
particular racial groups as sharing a common genetic ancestry—usually 
by using race as a crude surrogate for geographic or continental 
ancestry—members of those groups can be viewed as more “related” to 
each other (like an extended family) than to individuals from other 
groups.68 This problematic understanding of relatedness can then affect 
the calculation of RMPs. Generally speaking, the more fine-grained the 
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characterization of a particular reference population, the higher the odds 
of a random match,69 higher odds again favoring the suspect or 
defendant.  In the early years of forensic DNA analysis, when typically 
only four VNTR loci were tested, there were concerns that using a 
general, undifferentiated population database would produce 
inappropriately low RMPs.70 The decision to use race in constructing and 
categorizing reference populations was introduced into forensic DNA 
analysis with the belief that it would improve the precision of the 
calculations that generate RMPs.71  
In early 1991, two pairs of eminent population geneticists 
squared off against each other in the pages of Science, a highly 
influential scientific journal, to debate the problem of using racial 
categories in forensic DNA analysis.72 On one side were Professors 
Richard Lewontin of Harvard University and Daniel Hartl of the 
University of Washington.73 On the other side were Ranajit Chakraborty 
of the University of Texas and Kenneth Kidd of Yale University.74 Their 
dispute did not revolve around the question of whether to use race but 
rather how much race to use in constructing reference population 
databases from which to calculate match probabilities.75  
Lewontin and Hartl questioned the then-current practice of 
calculating allele frequencies in the racial categories used in the Census 
such as “Caucasian,” “Black,” and “Hispanic” to provide the basis for 
calculating RMPs.76 They argued that such groupings were too broad and 
that substantial “genetic substructur[ing]” occurred within the broad 
racial groupings that should be taken into account in calculating match 
probabilities.77 Using these broad racial groupings could produce RMPs 
with substantially lower odds than those that might be produced using 
more fine-grained ethnically identified subpopulations.78 These concerns 
grew logically out of Lewontin’s earlier path-breaking work showing 
how genetic variation within socially identified racial groupings was 
actually greater than variation observed between such groups.79 This 
work laid the foundations for understanding that race was incoherent as a 
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genetic concept, or at best, an overly crude surrogate for genetic 
variation that improperly tended to reify race as genetic.80 Thus Lewontin 
and Hartl observed that 
[a]mong genes that are polymorphic in European national or ethnic groups, the 
magnitude of the differences in allele frequency among subpopulations differs 
from one gene to the next. . . . For example, there are striking geographical 
clines of allele frequency across Europe for the ABO blood groups: the 
frequency of the B allele is 5 to 10% in Britain and Ireland, increases across 
Eastern Europe, and reaches 25 to 30% in the Soviet Union; the frequency of 
the O allele is 70 to 80% in Sardinians, Irish, and Scottish populations but 
lower in Eastern European populations. These clines reflect the migrations and 
political history of Europe over the last few thousand years.81 
Problems were even greater for the “heterogeneous assemblage” 
known as the “Hispanic” population, which presented “perhaps the worst 
case for calculating reliable probabilities.”82 Consequently, Lewontin and 
Hartl concluded that using reference databases organized by the broad 
racial groupings “Caucasian,” “Black,” and “Hispanic” was unjustified.83 
Chakraborty and Kidd argued that Lewontin and Hartl 
exaggerated both the extent of ethnic substructuring in America and its 
significance for calculating match probabilities.84 While conceding that 
some substructuring existed, they argued that its effects upon frequency 
estimates generated by using the broader racial databases were “trivial.”85 
Chakraborty and Kidd did not deny that using finer-grained ethnic 
reference populations might produce more precise allele frequency 
estimates.86 Rather, their point was that such an approach was 
unnecessary—and unnecessarily burdensome. Current technology and 
understandings of population genetics, they asserted, justified the use of 
broad racial and ethnic categories, which were, additionally, far more 
practical and currently available.87 Race was at the center of this early 
debate. But again, for these eminent scientists, it was not a question of 
whether to use race, but how, or more specifically how much (i.e., how 
fine-grained) race to use. 
This debate took place while the NRC Committee was 
conducting its study of DNA technology in forensic science.88 Its report, 
issued in 1992, discussed both sides of the issue without specifically 
taking sides. It did, however, choose “to assume for the sake of 
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discussion that population substructure may exist and to provide a 
method for estimating population frequencies in a manner that would 
adequately account for it.”89 The report recognized that “[p]opulation 
genetic studies show some substructure within racial groups for genetic 
variants. . . . Thus, North American Caucasians, [B]lacks, Hispanics, 
Asians, and Native Americans are not homogeneous groups.”90 In effect, 
this approach reflected the concerns expressed by Lewontin and Hartl, 
recognizing that social categories of race did not map neatly onto 
discrete, genetically definable population groups. 
The NRC’s 1992 report created problems for prosecutors. By 
taking cognizance of the difference of scientific opinion regarding the 
appropriate calculation of allele frequencies and RMPs, it seemed to 
assert that forensic DNA technologies lacked the sort of scientific 
consensus needed to support the introduction of such expert evidence.91 
Thus, for example, in the 1992 case of People v. Barney, the California 
Court of Appeal cited the NRC Report in concluding that disagreement 
and uncertainty in the scientific community regarding the selection of 
appropriate reference populations precluded the admission of DNA 
evidence based on the product rule.92 
By April 1993, the director of the FBI asked the NAS to conduct 
a rapid follow-up study to resolve these uncertainties.93 In 1994, the NRC 
formed a second committee (NRC II) with a specific mandate “to update 
and clarify discussion of the principles of population genetics and 
statistics as they apply to DNA evidence.”94 Meanwhile, the debate that 
continued concurrently in the scientific community would come to have 
significant consequences for the NRC II’s subsequent report.  
In 1994, Chakraborty and Kidd’s position received a major 
boost. That year Eric Lander of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
previously a vigorous critic of the lack of adequate standards in DNA 
typing, paired with Bruce Budowle, one of the principal architects of the 
FBI’s DNA-typing program, to write an article in the journal Nature, 
declaring “DNA fingerprinting dispute laid to rest.”95 The article argued 
that applying the product rule to the frequency estimates for four 
independent VNTRs generated odds of such magnitude that any 
technical statistical differences observed between the use of the broad 
racial databases (as advocated by Chakraborty and Kidd) versus more 
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fine-grained ethnic subgroup databases (as advocated by Lewontin and 
Hartl) were “of no practical consequence to the courts.”96 As Lander and 
Budowle observed,  
In the vast majority of cases, a jury needs to know only that a particular DNA 
pattern is very rare to weigh it in the context of a case: the distinction between 
frequencies of 10-4, 10-6 and 10-8 is irrelevant in the case of suspects identified 
by other means. . . . The most extreme positions range over a mere two orders 
of magnitude: whether the population frequency of a typical four-locus 
genotype should be stated, for example, as 10-5 or 10-7. The distinction is 
irrelevant for courtroom use.97  
Lander and Budowle were not arguing that racial subgroups 
themselves were not needed or desirable in calculating RMPs. The 
“distinction” they saw as “irrelevant” was the one between ethnic 
subgroups, such as Irish, and larger racial groups, such as Caucasian.98 
Thus, they were legitimating the then-current standard FBI practice of 
using broad racial groups such as “Black” and “Caucasian,” as reference 
databases for generating allele frequencies for calculating RMPs.99 
Significantly, Lander and Budowle did not argue for doing away with 
racial databases altogether in favor of using an undifferentiated general 
population database. Given the current state of forensic technology, 
which generated RMPs from examining VNTRs at only four loci, they 
deemed race relevant.100 They simply did not want too much of it—that 
is, they did not want law enforcement forced to undertake the 
burdensome task of developing more elaborate databases that reflected 
the wide array of genetic population substructuring that actually occurs 
across the globe.101 Given the odds generated by testing at four VNTR 
loci, they deemed the broad racial categories of the Census more than 
adequate for forensic purposes.102  
Lander and Budowle made a critical distinction between 
statistical and legal relevance. Though hardly the first to do so,103 Lander 
and Budowle used the distinction to quiet both the scientific debates and 
the legal uncertainties swirling around this new and powerful forensic 
technology. This distinction continues to play a role throughout the 
continuing development and application of DNA technology up to 
present day cases such as People v. Wilson.104 Another critic of the 
NRC’s 1992 report, David Kaye, of the Arizona State University School 
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of Law, made a similar distinction in a 1993 article in the Harvard 
Journal of Law & Technology.105 Kaye, who sat on the second NRC 
Committee,106 wrote that in calculating RMPs, “[t]he real issue . . . is not 
‘statistical significance’ but rather practical or substantive 
significance.”107 The difference was critical for Kaye and others because 
it provided the basis for validating the then-current law enforcement 
practices of using broad racial reference population databases. By 
distinguishing between statistical versus logical or practical significance, 
Kaye and others, such as Lander and Budowle, did not refute Lewontin 
and Hartl so much as bracket off their concerns as irrelevant to the legal 
applications of forensic DNA technology in courts.108 Of most immediate 
significance in terms of the unfolding story of the use of race in forensic 
DNA technology, is the fact that this distinction played a central role in 
the NRC II report, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence, issued in 
1996.109  
C.  NRC II: Questions of Race Laid to Rest? 
The NRC II report was undertaken to resolve the problems NRC 
I created for law enforcement by addressing “population genetics and 
statistics” related to the calculation of RMPs.110 It “argue[d] for using 
separate databases for different racial groups”111 even while it 
acknowledged Lewontin’s underlying argument that “the variability 
among individuals within a population is greater than that between 
populations.”112 Recognizing the uncertainties inherent in calculating 
RMPs, the report noted that “[t]he accuracy of the estimate will depend 
on the genetic model, the actual allele frequencies, and the size of the 
database.”113 It was confident, however, that “when several loci are used, 
the probability of a coincidental match is very small.”114 Nonetheless, the 
report recommended incorporating a ten-fold margin of error in RMP 
calculation, stating, “If the calculated probability of a random match 
between the suspect and evidence DNA is 1/(100 million), we can say 
with confidence that the correct value is very likely between 1/(10 
million) and 1/(billion).”115  
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At first glance, such a range may strike the reader as rather large, 
but the report legitimizes it by returning to the distinction between 
statistical and legal relevance. According to the NRC II Report, the true 
issue  
is not whether the probability is large or small, but how accurate it is. 
Probabilities are not untrustworthy simply because they are small. In most 
cases, given comparable non-DNA evidence, a judge or jury would probably 
reach the same conclusion if the probability of a random match were one in 
100,000 or one in 100 million.116 
In other words, the large range presented earlier in the report was 
of little practical or legal significance so long as it was good enough to 
guide a judge or jury in their deliberations. It was good enough for two 
reasons: first, because it was accurate—accuracy here can be crucially 
distinguished from precision, which the large range of probabilities 
certainly lacks; second, because the lower end of the range still presented 
odds so vanishingly small as to render it indistinguishable from the upper 
end of the range as a practical matter—that is, the difference was 
deemed to be insufficient to have any practical effect on the conclusion a 
judge or jury would reach in using the evidence.  
And yet, even accepting this huge range of variance, the report 
persisted in using race as an organizing category in calculating RMPs. 
Thus, even while acknowledging that “some assert that the word race is 
meaningless [in a genetic context,] . . . white (Caucasian), black (African 
American), Hispanic, east Asian (Oriental), and American Indian (Native 
American) [are] racial groups.”117 It justified this choice by asserting that 
“there are reproducible differences among the races in the frequencies of 
DNA profiles used in forensic settings, and these must be taken into 
account if errors are to be minimized.”118 
It is instructive to note here just where it is that “difference” 
made a difference in the calculation of RMPs. Difference was deemed 
insignificant when it manifested as a thousand-fold range for an 
“accurate” calculation using the product rule to compare a single sample 
against a single reference population database—that is, the “difference” 
between “one in 100,000 or one in 100 million” made no practical 
difference for use of the data in a court of law.119 To be fair, as noted 
above, the NRC II report recommended calculating RMPs with a margin 
of error limited to ten-fold in either direction120—but this still translates 
into a variation of one hundred-fold between the lowest and highest 
estimate. But when race was at issue in the NRC II report, the 
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“difference” of frequencies among racial reference populations became 
critical and had to be “taken into account if errors are to be 
minimized.”121  
Race enters into people’s consciousness in complex and often 
unanticipated ways. The NRC II report clearly focused on issues of race 
in response to the questions raised by the debate in which Lewontin and 
Hartl opposed Chakraborty’s and Kidd’s views. That debate involved the 
relation between social groups of race and genetic variation.122 Both sides 
recognized that racial categories were crude surrogates for capturing 
genetic variation across groups, but Chakraborty and Kidd were, in 
effect, arguing that race was nonetheless not “too crude”—that is, it was 
good enough for practical use in law enforcement because of the ability 
to generate astronomically low RMPs even allowing for a substantial 
range of variation.123 As a practical matter, the debate cast into doubt the 
admissibility of DNA forensic evidence in courts; hence the FBI’s urging 
that the issue be revisited by a second NRC Committee.124 The NRC II 
report, therefore, aimed to quiet the dispute, rendering it irrelevant to the 
practical application of forensic DNA technologies in law enforcement. 
Yet, it is unclear why the NRC II report characterized difference among 
racial reference populations as meaningful “error,” while it deemed the 
hundred (or even thousand) fold range of variance within a single 
reference population to be of no practical significance.125 This seems 
largely to be an artifact of the report’s focus on addressing the issues 
raised by Lewontin and Hartl in a manner that would allow forensic 
DNA testing to proceed unimpeded by concerns of the accuracy of using 
racial reference populations to calculate RMPs. The report needed to 
show that RMPs generated by using racial categories were good enough 
for practical use in courts of law. The utility and/or validity of using a 
general population database without reference to either race or ethnic 
subgroups was never really at issue.  
In the end, the report issued the following formal 
recommendation for estimating RMPs: 
In general, the calculation of a profile frequency should be made with the 
product rule. If the race of the person who left the evidence-sample DNA is 
known, the database for the person’s race should be used; if the race is not 
known, calculations for all the racial groups to which possible suspects belong 
should be made.126 
The NRC II report thus legitimized the then standard practice of 
using race to generate RMPs. In rejecting Lewontin and Hartl’s concerns 
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about broad racial databases, it seems also, implicitly, to have rejected—
or at least failed to fully appreciate—Lewontin’s cognate concerns about 
the incoherence of race as a genetic category and the dangers of reifying 
race as genetic.127  
III.  CURRENT STANDARD PRACTICES REGARDING RACE AND 
FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 
A.  The Impact of NRC II  
The NRC II report became tremendously influential in shaping 
forensic DNA techniques and their acceptance in courts of law. It 
established new norms for calculating RMPs generally and for using 
race-specific databases in particular. Following the NRC II 
recommendation, it has since become standard practice to present race-
specific RMPs.128 Thus, for example, in the 1999 case of People v. 
Soto,129 the California Supreme Court noted that the dispute regarding 
population substructuring, which had been at the heart of the 1992 case 
of People v. Barney,130 had “been eclipsed by subsequent important 
scientific developments, most notably the publication in 1996 of a 
completely new report by the NRC . . . .”131 The court concluded that 
using the product rule with respect to broad racial databases “has gained 
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.”132 Similarly, in 
People v. Wilson,133 the court referenced testimony by the California 
Department of Justice’s criminologist, Nicola Shea, in stating that “to 
help juries understand the significance of a DNA match, the Department 
followed the statistical approach recommended by [the NRC II report] 
for presenting the frequency with which genetic profiles occur.”134  
In cases such as Soto and Wilson we see that the use of racial 
databases characterized by the broad terms of the U.S. Census categories 
had emerged as normative referents for the calculation of RMPs. Thus, 
for example, in justifying its calculation of RMPs in Wilson, the State of 
California argued that the lower court  
correctly approve[d] the California Department of Justice’s (DOJ) generally 
accepted method for generating match probability statistics using reference 
data from major racial and ethnic groups. Typically, a range of statistics is 
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provided using three major U.S. population databases: African-American, 
Caucasian, and Hispanic. This method . . . is supported by NRC II.135  
As representative of current practice, People v. Wilson shows 
how fully integrated race has become in the conceptualization and 
practice of forensic DNA analysis. The use of race by the State is 
understood as requiring no justification other than that it had become 
“generally accepted” and is “typical.” 
B.  CODIS and the Move from VNTRs to STRs 
The NRC II report itself was based largely on an assessment of 
the then-current practice of testing samples at four VNTR loci.136 
Ironically, by 1997, barely a year after the report had issued, a new 
technology had emerged to replace four loci VNTR analysis using 
restriction fragment polymorphism (RFLP) methods of analysis.137 In 
1985 Kary Mullis, along with a research group at the Cetus Corporation, 
discovered a technique known as Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), 
which enabled scientists “to make millions of copies of a specific 
sequence of DNA in a matter of only a few hours.”138 The ability to 
amplify segments of DNA is critical to forensic analysis.139 The benefits 
of PCR are that it “is sensitive, rapid, and not limited by the quantity of 
DNA as . . . [RFLP] methods are.”140 PCR enabled a shift in focus from 
VNTRs to sections of DNA known as “Short Tandem Repeats” 
(STRs).141 VNTRs are typically ten to one hundred bases in length.142 
STRs (also known as microsatellites) are regions of DNA only two to six 
base pairs in length.143 STRs are highly variable across individuals and 
are easily amplified by PCR, thus making them very effective for 
purposes of human identification.144  
In 1996, the FBI commenced an effort to develop a set of STR 
loci to be used as standard referents for the calculations of RMPs in 
forensic DNA analysis.145 In November 1997, the FBI settled on thirteen 
core STR loci to be the basis of the CODIS (COmbined DNA Index 
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System) national DNA Database, which was launched in 1998.146  New 
technologies allowing for “multiplex” testing of multiple loci at once 
were soon capable of regularly generating RMPs rarer than one in one 
trillion.147  The Minnesota State Department of Public Safety has noted 
that “STRs are very discriminating for single-source samples. Typically, 
a complete DNA profile might be found in less than one in one hundred 
billion people. A typical DNA report would read ‘This profile would not 
be expected to occur more than once among unrelated individuals in the 
world population.’”148 By 2000 the FBI laboratory and many others 
stopped using RFLP analysis altogether in favor of PCR analysis of the 
thirteen CODIS STRs.149 Because of their use in the FBI database, the 
thirteen CODIS STRs have become a national (indeed international) 
standard and have come to “dominate the genetic information that has 
been collected to date on human beings.”150  
CODIS was initially authorized by the DNA Identification Act 
of 1994151 and became operational in 1998.152 As described by the FBI,  
CODIS is implemented as a distributed database with three hierarchical levels 
(or tiers)—local, state, and national. NDIS [National DNA Index System] is the 
highest level in the CODIS hierarchy, and enables the laboratories participating 
in the CODIS Program to exchange and compare DNA profiles on a national 
level. All DNA profiles originate at the local level (LDIS), then flow to the 
state (SDIS) and national levels. SDIS allows laboratories within states to 
exchange DNA profiles. The tiered approach allows state and local agencies to 
operate their databases according to their specific legislative or legal 
requirements.153  
As of October 2007, there were over five million DNA profiles 
in CODIS.154 The profiles themselves are not classified by race. Rather 
they are primarily used, much like a database of fingerprints, to aid in the 
investigation of crimes by providing matches or “hits” to DNA evidence 
left at crime scenes.155 In the context of establishing an initial match 
using the CODIS database, race is therefore irrelevant.  
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Nonetheless, race has come to pervade the characterization of 
forensic DNA data generated using the standard thirteen CODIS loci. 
This is because establishing a match is only the first step in applying 
forensic DNA technology.156 Once a match is found, whether using the 
CODIS database or not, law enforcement must still take the further step 
of calculating an RMP for any given DNA profile.157 It is at this stage 
that race enters CODIS—and in a more powerful way than ever before. 
In addition to the basic CODIS database, the FBI has generated a 
population file to estimate allele frequencies according to specifically 
identified racial or ethnic groups.158 This population file is based on a 
2001 study led by Bruce Budowle, which typed allele frequencies for the 
thirteen CODIS loci from forty-one population data sets.159 Budowle 
classified the results in terms of five “major population groups: African 
American, U.S. Caucasian, Hispanic, Far East Asian, and Native 
American.”160 These allele frequencies have since become the standard 
reference database for calculating racially identified RMPs.161 Thus, for 
example, in People v. Wilson, the court, referencing the Budowle study, 
noted that criminologist Nicola Shea described how the Department of 
Justice “used databases that the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
published in the Journal of Forensic Sciences reflecting profile 
frequencies in the Caucasian, Hispanic and African-American 
populations.”162 
IV.  RACE, TECHNOLOGY, AND “CARE OF THE DATA”163 
A.  Race Versus Technology 
The casual and perfunctory assignment of social categories of 
race to biological samples in professional discussions of forensic DNA 
stands in marked contrast to the meticulous care taken concerning the 
more technical aspects of DNA extraction, amplification, and analysis. 
The discussions of each in a 2005 article164 by Peter Vallone, Amy 
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Decker, and John Butler, of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology’s (NIST) Human Identity Project165 team, are fairly typical. 
This particular article involved the characterization of allelic frequencies 
for seventy single nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNPs” ) in DNA samples 
taken from three racially marked groups: U.S. Caucasian, African-
American, and Hispanic.166 The article presents its techniques for racially 
identifying the DNA samples as follows: “Anonymous liquid blood 
samples with self-identified ethnicities were purchased from Interstate 
Blood Bank, Inc. (Memphis, TN) and Millennium Biotech, Inc. (Ft. 
Lauderdale, FL).”167 “Self-identification” thus provides the sum total of 
all care and technique devoted by Vallone et al. to characterizing genetic 
samples by race. Contrast this with their discussion of the more 
apparently technical aspects of how they manipulated the samples once 
in the lab (which is quoted at length to heighten the contrast): 
 
2. DNA extraction 
Blood samples were extracted using a modified salting out procedure. 
3. Quantification 
Extracted DNA was quantified using UV spectrophotometry followed by a 
PicoGreen assay to adjust concentrations to approximately 1 ng/µl. 
 
4. SNP markers 
The 70 autosomal SNP markers are listed in Table 1 (see also 
http://www.cstl.nist.gov/biotech/strbase/SNP.htm). The PCR primer sequences 
were obtained from Orchid Cellmark (personal communication, Jeanine Baisch, 
Orchid Cellmark Dallas). The exact chromosomal locations were ascertained 
using BLAT (http://genome.ucsc.edu/cgi-bin/hgBlat) and dbSNP 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/SNP/) and are based on the July 2003 assembly 
of the human genome. All of the SNPs are C/T transitions. 
 
5. PCR amplification 
For each sample, the 70 SNP markers were typed in 11 unique 6-plexes and a 
single 4-plex PCR. The final concentrations of the six (or 4) PCR primer pairs 
were present at 0.5 µM for all multiplex PCRs. Amplifications were performed 
in reaction volumes of 10 µl using a master mix containing 1X GeneAmp® 
PCR Gold buffer (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, CA), 4.5 mmol/l MgCl2, 
250 µmol/l deoxynucleotide triphosphates (dNTPs; Promega Corporation, 
Madison, WI), 0.16 mg/ml bovine serum albumin (BSA) fraction V (Sigma, St. 
Louis, MO), and 0.5 unit of AmpliTaq Gold® DNA polymerase (Applied 
Biosystems). The thermal cycling program was carried out on a GeneAmp 
9700 (Applied Biosystems) using the following conditions in 9600-emulation 
mode (i.e., ramp speeds of 1 °C/s): 
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95 °C for 10 min 
Three cycles of {95 °C for 30 s, 50 °C for 55 s, 72 °C for 30 s} 
18 cycles of {95 °C for 30 s, 50 °C for 30 s +0.2 °C per cycle. 
72 °C for 30 s} 
11 cycles of {95 °C for 30 s, 55 °C for 30 s, 72 °C for 30 s} 
72 °C for 7 min 
25 °C until removed from thermocycler 
 
Following PCR amplification, unincorporated primers and dNTPs were 
removed by adding 4 µl of a Exo-SAP enzyme cocktail consisting of 1.4 µl 
Exonuclease I (10 U/µl) and 2.6 µl (1U/µl) of shrimp alkaline phosphatase 
(SAP; USB Corp., Cleveland, OH) to each 10 µl PCR reaction. Reactions were 
mixed briefly and incubated at 37 °C for 90 min and then 80 ºC for 20 min to 
inactivate the enzymes.168 
 
The point here is not to assess (or even understand) the 
intricacies of the technical analysis performed by Vallone et al. on their 
DNA samples. Rather, it is to contrast the extreme care and detail 
devoted to illustrating the techniques performed in the lab with the casual 
and perfunctory discussion of how the samples came to be racially 
marked in the first place. As scientists, Vallone et al. understandably go 
into greatest detail with respect to those very techniques and practices in 
which they are professionally trained and proficient. This detail reflects 
their reasonable understanding that the extraction, amplification, and 
analysis of DNA take great care and expertise.  
The contrasting lack of care taken in characterizing the racial 
identity of the genetic samples indicates an implicit assumption that such 
characterizations are obvious, uncomplicated, and take no special 
expertise. This contrast may be understood more broadly as reflecting a 
conceptual separation of the world of the “social” from that of the 
“natural,” where the former is understood to contain transparent 
categories accessible to all, while the latter requires specialized 
knowledge and expertise for proper analysis and interpretation. In other 
words, race is seen as easy and obvious; DNA is seen as difficult and 
complex.169 There is an utter failure to consider that social subjects such 
as race may demand similar rigor, expertise, and care in handling as 
scientific subjects such as DNA. 
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B.  Social Versus Genetic “Race” 
Ironically, this separation of the social from the natural is 
enabled by the work of geneticists such as Lewontin who, together with a 
wide array of social scientists, have worked diligently since World War 
II to reconfigure race from a biological construct into a social 
construct.170 It is precisely because race is currently widely understood as 
a social phenomenon that forensic scientists are able to effectively 
marginalize it from their analysis of the biological construct of DNA. As 
a result, their care of the data extends only to the analysis of DNA 
samples while wholly overlooking the complexities of using racial 
categories in relation to genetics.  
In effect, forensic scientists have simply adopted the broad 
categories of race and ethnicity used in the U.S. Census to organize their 
genetic data.171 The Census, in turn, is based on the Office of 
Management and Budget’s (“OMB”) Directive 15 on “Race and Ethnic 
Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting,”172 which 
provides the following categories as a minimum standard for 
maintaining, collecting, and presenting data on race and ethnicity for all 
federal reporting purposes: American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian; 
Black or African American; Hispanic or Latino; Native Hawaiian or 
Other Pacific Islander; and White.173 
These federally mandated standards emerged as a consequence 
of major government programs and legal initiatives instituted since the 
1960s. The OMB categories provide the basis for both census 
information and access to a variety of governmental goods and services 
that are contingent upon membership in a particular racial or ethnic 
group.174 For example, federal users of racial data provided by the census 
include: the Department of Education, Department of Justice, 
Department of Labor, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
Federal Reserve, Department of Health and Human Services, Housing 
and Urban Development, Department of Agriculture, and the Veterans 
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Administration.175 Alice Robbin notes that “[g]roups must be counted in 
order to make credible claims for political representation, demonstrate 
discriminatory practices against them, seek and obtain legal remedies, 
receive governmental assistance for a host of social programs, and 
evaluate current, as well as develop new public policy.”176 Additionally, 
the OMB racial and ethnic categories provide the framework for 
evaluating school desegregation, electoral districting, and other civil 
rights initiatives.177  
Given the social and political uses which such standards were 
designed to serve, it should come as no surprise that Directive 15 
explicitly acknowledges that the categories it provides are social in 
character, not biological or genetic.178 Using these same categories in the 
context of genetic research, however, presents issues of a different order. 
As Lee et al. note,  
[r]esearch utilizing race serves to “naturalize” the boundaries dividing human 
populations, making it appear that the differences found reflect laws of nature. 
In fact, the use of race and ethnicity in biomedical research is problematic 
because it is caught in a tautology, both informed by, and reproducing, 
“racialized truths.”179  
This dynamic reinforces what sociologist Michael Omi has characterized 
as “an interesting dilemma facing scientists in the United States. On one 
hand,” Omi asserts, “scientists routinely use racial categories in their 
research . . . . On the other hand, many scientists feel that racial 
classifications are meaningless and unscientific.”180 
C.  The Obvious Solution: A Non-Racial, General Population 
Database 
Race was originally introduced into the calculation of RMPs in 
the early years of forensic DNA analysis in the hope of providing more 
refined statistical calculations.181 The rationale was grounded in the 
reasonable observation that there is a modicum of genetic variation 
across certain human populations.182 Capturing this variation might 
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provide more accurate RMPs.183 Greater accuracy was important in the 
early years of forensic DNA analysis when RMPs were generated using 
only four VNTR loci.184 With such limited data, the variation of RMPs 
generated using different reference populations could be of forensic 
significance.185 
Today the situation has changed significantly. With the advent of 
multiplex assays testing for the thirteen standard CODIS loci, forensic 
scientists are now capable of regularly generating RMPs with 
denominators many times in excess of the entire world’s population.186 
As another article with the FBI’s Bruce Budowle as lead author put it, as 
early as 2000, “[b]y typing these [13] STR loci, the random match 
probability for a multiple locus profile will be exceedingly small. The 
average random match probability for unrelated individuals for the 13 
STR loci is less than one in a trillion, even in populations with reduced 
genetic variability.”187 Under such circumstances, the concern originally 
expressed by Lewontin and Hartl—that using broader racial categories 
will not produce accurate enough RMPs—fades into irrelevance.188  As a 
practical matter, when one is dealing with odds in the hundreds of 
billions or trillions, the more fine-grained characterizations of genetic 
variation among ethnic subgroups called for in Lewontin and Hartl’s 
1991 Science article189 are simply not necessary.  
The issue then shifts from how much race to use to whether to 
use race at all. As is made evident by the range of odds generated in 
cases such as People v. Wilson (“one of 96 billion Caucasians, one of 
180 billion Hispanics, and one of 340 billion African-Americans”),190 the 
use of a non-racially marked general reference population would still 
generate RMPs whose reciprocals would exceed the world’s population 
many fold. Under such circumstances, any differences between RMPs 
generated by using race-specific reference populations and a general 
population are without forensic significance. Thus, it is no longer 
necessary even to use the broad racial reference populations advocated 
by Chakraborty and Kidd back in 1991.191  
The possibility of abandoning racial reference populations in 
favor of a general population database was broached in a 2000 report by 
the National Institute of Justice’s National Commission on the Future of 
DNA Evidence.192 In the context of discussing the rise of testing for 
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STRs in contrast with the older method of VNTR analysis, the report 
noted that  
[i]t is already apparent that most of the STR variability is within groups. 
Although groups differ, the mean differences between groups are less than the 
individual differences within groups; profiles that are rare in one group tend to 
be rare in others. With enough loci it may be possible to have a single database 
for all the major groups in the United States.193 
Given the ability to generate RMPs in the trillions, it seems 
obvious that we currently have enough loci to have a single non-racial 
reference population database. The question remains, “Why do we 
continue to use race?” 
D.  The Inertial Power of Race 
There is no easy answer to this question. I suggest that there is an 
inertial power to race in American society that propels the continued use 
of race long after any original rationale for its introduction may have 
faded. In particular, I consider three possible dynamics contributing to 
the persistent use of race in the presentation of forensic DNA evidence 
even after current technology has obviated the need for race-specific 
databases: 1) the persistent conceptualization of race as genetic; 2) the 
confusion of statistical significance with forensic significance; and 3) the 
deep-seated American identification of violent crime and race.  
First, with respect to genetics, in spite of decades of efforts on 
the part of social and natural scientists to sever the ties between race and 
biology, large segments of American society continue to conceptualize 
race primarily in genetic terms.194 The rise of modern genomics was 
supposed to resolve the dispute.195 Upon the completion of the first draft 
of the human genome in 2000, President Clinton declared, “After all, I 
believe one of the great truths to emerge from this triumphant expedition 
inside the human genome is that in genetic terms all human beings, 
regardless of race, are more than 99.9% the same.”196 
At the same press conference, Dr. J. Craig Venter, president and 
CEO of Celera Genomics, reinforced Clinton’s message, asserting that 
“the concept of race has no genetic or scientific basis.”197 Yet, ironically, 
since this iconic press conference, genetic conceptualizations of race 
seem to have reemerged with a vengeance. As anthropologist Sandra Lee 
has noted,  
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the current trajectory of genomic research is increasingly focused on the 0.01 
per cent genetic difference that is believed to separate one individual from 
another. The search for functional genetic variability is increasingly taken up in 
populations that are identified by conventional notions of race. This trajectory 
is the result of a confluence of factors, including a growing infrastructure of 
research materials that are racially categorized through the creation of 
biobanks. Such sorting practices reflect the ongoing conflict over the meaning 
of ‘race’ in science and medicine. In the emerging era of the new genetics, in 
which super-computer technology has given way to an explosion of human 
genetic data, biobanks that utilize taxonomies of race in the classification, 
storage and distribution of DNA samples become racializing technologies that 
promote notions of racial biology in research protocols designed to discover 
group difference.198 
Sociologist Troy Duster has further argued that “new claims that 
DNA analysis of crime scene data will assist criminal investigations” 
have led to a “molecular reinscription of race in the biological 
sciences.”199 The same technology underlying the creation of racialized 
forensic DNA databases is also being used for drug development200 and 
to market new genetic ancestry tracing services.201 Thus, there have 
emerged both structural and commercial incentives to continue to use 
race in relation to genetics. This dynamic undergirds the inertial power of 
race in forensic DNA analysis by providing a broader context in which 
race is understood, somehow, to be naturally or logically connected to 
genetics. This dynamic is further reinforced by the tendency of forensic 
DNA experts, as discussed above,202 to take race as an obvious, 
unproblematic category that does not require the same care and analysis 
as genetic data. 
Second, the technical ability to generate statistically significant 
variation in RMPs across racial databases has led to the unquestioned 
assumption that such variation is also legally significant. Using the 
thirteen CODIS loci, forensic experts around the world have 
characterized allele frequencies for numerous ethnically and racially 
marked populations.203 Modest frequency variation at each individual 
locus, when multiplied across loci by the product rule, can lead to 
apparently significant variations in RMPs across races.204 Thus, in cases 
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such as People v. Wilson, the variation in RMPs across race-specific 
databases may appear, at first blush, to be important.205 In that case, 
RMPs varied from 1 in 96 billion Caucasians, to 1 in 180 billion 
Hispanics, and 1 in 340 billion African-Americans.206 According to the 
databases, defendant Wilson’s genetic profile was more the three times 
as likely to occur in a Caucasian as an African-American—an apparently 
significant difference. But in the forensic context, this statistically 
significant difference has no real practical importance. When the world’s 
population is under seven billion, the difference between an RMP of 1 in 
96 billion and an RMP of 1 in 340 billion provides no meaningful 
distinction for a finder of fact. Both are astronomically low probabilities. 
Nonetheless, experts’ ability to generate statistically significant 
differences across races seems to have propelled the continued use of 
racial databases—even when these differences are of no practical legal 
significance.207  
Ironically, the reverse logic is used by law enforcement to 
support the rising use of race to generate suspect profiles from DNA 
evidence left at the scene of a crime.208 This sort of genetic racial 
profiling uses allele frequencies to generate an estimate of the likely 
racial or ethnic background of an as yet unidentified perpetrator.209 In this 
context, Troy Duster notes that law enforcement officials themselves 
have made a distinction between theoretical and practical significance of 
racial difference in genetics. Thus, as Duster notes,  
[w]hen representative spokespersons from the biological sciences say that there 
is no such thing as race, they mean, correctly, that there are no discrete racial 
categories that come to a discrete beginning and end, that there is nothing 
mutually exclusive about our current (or past) categories of race, and that there 
is more genetic variation within categories of race than between them. All this 
is true. However, when Scotland Yard or the Birmingham police force or the 
New York Police Department wants to narrow the list of suspects in a crime, 
they are not primarily concerned with tight taxonomic systems of classification 
with no overlapping categories. That is the stuff of theoretical physics and 
philosophical logic, not the practical stuff of crime-solving or the practical 
application of molecular genetics for health delivery via genetic screening, and 
all the messy overlapping categories that will inevitably be involved with such 
enterprises. That is, some African Americans have cystic fibrosis even though 
the likelihood of that is far greater among Americans of North European 
descent and, in a parallel if not symmetrical way, some American Whites have 
sickle cell anaemia even though the likelihood of that is far greater among 
Americans of West African descent. But in the world of cost-effective decision-
making, genetic screening for these disorders is routinely based on 
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commonsense versions of the phenotype. The same is true with regard to the 
quite practical matter of naming suspects.210  
Here, the scientific understanding that race is not genetic is 
trumped in practice by the purported ability of some genetic tests to 
estimate the likelihood that a suspect belongs to one or another socially 
identifiable race. Law enforcement is using race because it is perceived 
to be of practical significance—even if not scientific.211 Yet, in the 
courtroom context, it appears that the reverse is the case: race is used 
because it is perceived as scientific—even if not of practical significance.  
Race persists largely because it has become normative; an 
unquestioned, standardized practice that persists long after the rationale 
for it has faded. In Wilson, the State argued for the legitimacy of using 
race-specific RMPs on the grounds that such was the “standard 
practice”212 and the “generally accepted method for generating match 
probability statistics”213 and that “typically” the state and federal labs 
used “three major U.S. population databases: African-American, 
Caucasian, and Hispanic.”214 General acceptance, typicality, and 
standardization—these all powerfully drive the inertial power of race. 
Third, there is the unfortunate but well documented tendency in 
the United States to identify race and violent crime. In Whitewashing 
Race, Michael Brown et al. discuss a cultural shift that began in the 
1960s when the image of “the brave little girl walking up to the 
schoolhouse door in the face of jeering white crowds was replaced by 
fearsome young black men coming down the street ready to take your 
wallet or your life.”215 In the context of the rising racialization of crime in 
the United States, Rothenberg and Wang observe that “[f]rom 1990 to 
2004, blacks were five times more likely than whites to be incarcerated, 
and in 2000, blacks and Latinos comprised 63% of incarcerated adults, 
even though together they represented only 25% of the total 
population.”216 Similarly, while examining the impact of DNA 
technology on the criminal justice system, Simon Cole concludes that 
[a]t the endpoint of this system is a carceral system that embodies gross race 
and class disparities, even if differential rates of offending are taken into 
account: two thirds of people in prison are racial and ethnic minorities, one in 
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eight black males in their twenties are in prison or jail, three-quarters of persons 
in prison for drugs are people of color.217 
Considering the dynamics that have produced such inequalities, 
Brown et al. review an array of historical, legal, and sociological data on 
race and crime in the United States. Citing a “classic . . . observational 
study of police responses to juveniles in a midwestern city in the 
1960s,”218 they note that police “‘justified their selective treatment’ [of 
black youths] on ‘epidemiological lines,’” concentrating on “‘those 
youths whom they believed were most likely to commit delinquent 
acts.’”219 They argue, however, that  
the result of this “actuarial” reasoning . . . is to exacerbate the very differences 
that are invoked to justify the racially targeted practices in the first place. This 
in turn helps to cement the public’s image, and the police’s image, of the gun-
toting gangster or drug dealer as black or Latino. And this confirms the validity 
of the police focus on youth of color, which then goes around and around in the 
same kind of vicious circle . . . described a generation ago.220  
The same sort of actuarial reasoning is at work in Duster’s 
identification of the use of genetics in the “practical matter of naming 
suspects.”221 The association of crime and race produces more racialized 
crime.222 As Dorothy Roberts has noted, the resulting mass incarceration 
is “iatrogenic”223—by damaging social networks, distorting social norms, 
and destroying social citizenship, the disproportionate incarceration of 
minorities has produced a vicious cycle of crime and repression that 
further reinforces the identification of race and crime in the public 
mind.224 
Taken together, the persistent conceptualization of race as 
genetic, the confusion of statistical with forensic significance, and the 
deep-seated American identification of violent crime and race may be 
understood to frame and facilitate the inertial power of race—to 
perpetuate itself as a salient category of forensic DNA analysis long after 
its practical legal utility has passed. 
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V.  PRESENTING RACE AND FORENSIC DNA IN COURT 
In discussing the possibility of moving beyond race in forensic 
DNA analysis, the National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence 
mentioned that a general population database “may appeal to those who 
would like to emphasize individual differences and ignore group 
differences.”225 The pertinent issue presented by technological advances 
in forensic DNA analysis, however, is not whether we want to ignore 
group difference. Rather, it is what justification exists to continue to 
present DNA evidence in terms of race. It is to this question that we now 
turn by looking at how race is currently used in presenting forensic DNA 
evidence in courts of law. 
California provides an apt site to pursue this question. From 
People v. Barney226 in 1992 to People v. Wilson227 in 2006, a series of 
California cases has played an important role both in reflecting and 
shaping practices concerning the use of racial data in the presentation of 
forensic DNA evidence from its early years to the present day. These 
cases chart a trajectory from the initial rejection of RMPs calculated 
using broad racial databases228 to the embrace of racial databases in the 
aftermath of the NRC II report,229 the renewed questioning of which 
databases were appropriate to reference,230 and, finally, the full embrace 
of the standardized use of broad racial databases in the calculation and 
presentation of RMPs to a jury in a criminal case.231  
A.  Early Cases: DNA in Flux  
As noted above,232 the court in People v. Barney found that 
disagreement and uncertainty in the scientific community regarding the 
selection of appropriate reference populations precluded the admission of 
DNA evidence based on the product rule.233 The court discussed not only 
the findings of the first NRC report but also dealt at length with the 1991 
dispute that pinned Lewontin and Hartl against Chakraborty and Kidd in 
the pages of Science over the selection of appropriate reference 
populations for calculating RMPs.234 The court then went on to comment 
on how the first NRC report had taken note of this controversy235 and 
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concluded that because the dispute among experts remained unresolved, 
the court could not admit into evidence RMPs calculated using the broad 
racial databases.236  
People v. Barney was followed by a flurry of discussion and 
general professional hand-wringing over the need to resolve the disputes 
so that DNA evidence could be used with impunity.237 The second NRC 
report issued in 1996 seemed to settle the argument in favor of 
Chakraborty and Kidd, opening the door to the free use of racial 
databases in calculating RMPs.238 The 1999 California case of People v. 
Soto took note of this development when it effectively overruled People 
v. Barney on the grounds that the scientific community had accepted use 
of the product rule in DNA forensic evidence.239  
In Soto, the defendant was charged with rape.240 The court 
recounted that, although the victim was unable to identify her assailant 
because he wore a mask, “[s]he described her assailant as a [w]hite male 
. . . with light or blond hair and an olive complexion.”241 Soto was 
described as “Latino . . . with a dark complexion and black hair.”242 
Nonetheless, DNA from semen left at the crime scene matched Soto’s.243 
Using the older RLFP analysis of four genetic loci,244 Robert Keister, a 
criminalist at the Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD), testified 
at trial that “there was a probability of 1 in 189 million of finding that 
same DNA pattern in individuals selected at random from the population 
represented by the OCSD’s Hispanic database.”245 Interestingly, at the 
preliminary examination before the trial, Keister initially calculated a 
probability of 1 in 214 million.246 This difference of well over 10% 
resulted from “add[ing] some more samples to [the OCSD] database and 
. . . [running] further tests on the augmented database.”247 No explanation 
was given for why samples were added, where they came from, or how 
they were characterized as “Hispanic.” Further discussion revealed that 
Keister also used FBI Hispanic databases to produce the following 
frequency estimates: “(1) Southwest Hispanic (Texas): 1 in 55 million; 
(2) Southeast Hispanic (Florida): 1 in 2.3 billion; (3) U.S. Black: 1 in 2.4 
billion; and (4) U.S. Caucasian: 1 in 3 billion.”248 Asked to comment on 
the significance of the variation among frequency estimates, another 
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DNA expert witness, Dr. Bruce Kovacs, professor of medicine at 
University of Southern California, testified that  
 [the denominators] are astronomically large numbers. The significance of 
whether something is 1 in 55 million or 1 in 110 million versus 1 in 4 billion is 
something that I can’t really get my hands on in a real concrete way to 
distinguish that difference. It’s a very, very, very rare event.249   
In this context it seems clear that the experts are making an 
implicit distinction between statistical significance and forensic 
significance. Kenneth Kidd himself testified at the trial and made just 
such a distinction, which the court found to support the notion that “any 
difference in estimates over one in a million was pragmatically 
meaningless.”250 From such detailed discussions of odds ratios using very 
specific numbers that carry the authority of scientific expertise, the 
witness ultimately characterized the odds of the match simply as “very, 
very, very rare”—not particularly scientific terminology, but apparently 
adequate to aid the relevant finder of fact in making a determination of 
guilt or innocence.  
One might ask why it was acceptable in Soto to significantly 
change frequency estimates by the addition of more racialized data or 
reference to other databases but apparently unacceptable (or at least not 
considered) to change frequency estimates by removing race altogether. 
The Soto court’s further discussion of the rationale for using racialized 
databases provides some insight into this issue. Thus, the court noted that  
[m]ajor laboratories that do RFLP analysis . . . have developed their own 
separate population databases for each of several broad racial or ethnic 
categories such as Caucasian, Black, and Hispanic, the assumption being that 
mating among members of any one of those categories of the United States 
population is sufficiently random to justify using them in conjunction with the 
product rule to calculate the frequency of a DNA profile.251 
The assumption of random mating was central to overcoming 
Lewontin and Hartl’s concerns about ethnic substructuring and hence 
supporting the court’s decision to reject the reasoning of the Barney 
court and admit the race-specific frequency estimates into evidence. The 
court goes on in a footnote, however, to consider and reject the 
possibility of using a non-racially marked database for calculating RMPs, 
stating that 
[c]onversely, the laboratories do not use a single interracial United States 
database, presumably because the incidence of random mating between 
members of the different racial categories is deemed low enough to preclude 
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use of the product rule to calculate an overall frequency statistic for the United 
States population as a whole.252 
The characterization of a single general database as “interracial” 
is in itself notable. It conflates the absence of racial markers assigned to 
DNA samples with the presence of interracial mating among the sources 
of such samples. Viewed in this light, the court’s characterization of an 
“interracial” genetic database may be seen as reflecting a much deeper, 
unarticulated, and misguided understanding of races as biologically 
distinct in meaningful ways that are perpetuated by mating patterns. Such 
presumptions reflect Jim Crow-era logic of anti-miscegenation where 
through either de facto or de jure historical patterns individuals were 
“deemed” to mate across racial lines in only small numbers.253 The 
failings of such an anti-miscegenation logic are evident in the historical 
reality of interracial mating throughout the country’s history254 and are 
especially pronounced with respect to the category “Hispanic,” which, as 
Lewontin and Hartl noted in the 1991 Science article “is a biological 
hodgepodge. It includes people of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Guatemalan, 
Cuban, Spanish, and other ancestries.”255   
However, none of these points were made at trial because the 
expert witnesses for the defense were still arguing that more ethnicity 
was needed, not less, to calculate RMPs.256 Thus, one defense expert 
advocated for “separate databases from the separate ancestral populations 
that live in places like Cuba, Mexico, Spain, and Central America.”257 
This is perhaps still understandable in a case where the older RFLP 
technique was used to analyze only four genetic loci, but soon this 
technique would be superseded by PCR analysis of up to thirteen CODIS 
loci.258 
B.  From Pizarro to Wilson: Race in Flux 
The 2003 case of People v. Pizarro259 marked another major shift 
in the presentation and use of racially marked forensic DNA evidence in 
court. Michael Pizarro was convicted of murder and rape in 1990.260 He 
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appealed the case in 1992 on the grounds that the prosecution did not 
prove that RFLP testing of DNA evidence was at that time “generally 
accepted in the scientific community.”261 The case was remanded for a 
“thorough evidentiary hearing,” which occurred in 1998 (by which time 
such issues were largely resolved in the scientific community262), and the 
court “ruled that the evidence was admissible and reentered the 
judgment.”263  
In this second appeal, Pizarro contended that there was a basic 
error in the presentation of the DNA evidence when the prosecution 
informed the jury “that the DNA profile frequency . . . was the 
probability of finding a matching profile in the Hispanic population.”264 
Pizarro himself was identified as Hispanic, but the ethnic identity of the 
perpetrator was not known independently.265 The court ruled in Pizarro’s 
favor, finding that the use of the Hispanic database presumed that the 
perpetrator was in fact Hispanic.266 Nevertheless, the court did not decide 
“whether there was sufficient evidence to conclude the perpetrator in this 
case was Hispanic.”267 It also concluded that “recurring thematically 
throughout the issues in this case are evidentiary violations founded on 
the improper assumption that the defendant was in fact the perpetrator 
and that the defendant’s traits therefore could be relied upon to provide 
or clarify those traits of the perpetrator forming the basis of the DNA 
evidence.”268 The court argued that “in the absence of sufficient evidence 
of the perpetrator’s ethnicity, any particular ethnic frequency is 
irrelevant”269 and found that “the improper mention of ethnicity unfairly 
and unjustifiably encourages the jurors to focus on ethnicity and race—
specifically the ethnicity and race of the defendant, the only suspect 
before them.”270  
In a footnote, the court presented three options that prosecutors 
have for presenting profile frequencies: 
(1) establish that the perpetrator more likely than not belongs to a particular 
ethnic population, then present only the frequency in that particular ethnic 
population; (2) present only the most conservative frequency, without mention 
of ethnicity; or (3) present the frequency in the general, nonethnic population.  
These options promote the goals of admitting only relevant evidence and 
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eliminating unjustifiable and potentially prejudicial references to ethnicity and 
race.271  
The court here seemed to be acutely sensitive to the dangers of 
improperly injecting race into the presentation of DNA evidence. 
Significantly, it broached the possibility of moving beyond race in the 
presentation of frequencies. Nonetheless, it remained primarily 
concerned with the proper management of racial references and did not 
go on specifically to question the underlying utility (or lack thereof) of 
race itself as an analytic category in the presentation of DNA evidence. 
In the course of reaching this conclusion, the court’s opinion 
presents some revealing discussions of the meaning and significance of 
race in forensic DNA analysis. For example, as the court noted, the State 
argued that any reference to race was harmless in part because 
“frequencies do not vary greatly by ethnicity.”272 This, of course, raises 
the issue of why one should use ethnicity (or race) at all if the differences 
are so insignificant. Indeed, here it becomes clear that under such 
circumstances the only thing that race adds to the presentation of such 
DNA evidence is race itself—not simply as a marker of the suspect, but 
as a conceptual framework for constructing a relationship among violent 
crime, genetics, and race.  
At the 1990 trial, the only scientific witness testified that “[t]he 
likelihood of finding another unrelated Hispanic individual with a similar 
profile as Mr. Pizarro is one in approximately 250,000.”273 Such odds fall 
well below 1 in 1,000,000, beyond which geneticist Kenneth Kidd saw 
no pragmatic significance;274 hence, they may seem to justify the use of a 
different racial database in this case. It turns out, however, that Pizarro 
was actually identified as “half Hispanic and half Caucasian.”275 When 
asked how he could calculate RMPs in such a situation, the expert in the 
original trial stated that “there is nothing we can do other than to 
compare them to the two populations and we would use only the smaller 
of the two in our report. . . . [Using the smaller population] is less 
detrimental to the defendant.”276 Pizarro’s “mixed” race presented a 
problem for the witness. (It certainly flies in the face of the anti-
miscegenation logic of Soto.277 ) Analytically, the expert literally 
segregated Pizarro’s racial identities, producing separate RMPs with 
reference to distinct White and Hispanic databases. His conceptual 
framework could not encompass the concept of mixed race—rather it 
was premised upon, and indeed demanded, a logic of racial purity.  
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In the aftermath of Pizarro, David Kaye wrote a powerful and 
influential critique of the court’s reasoning regarding the use of ethnic 
reference populations in calculating RMPs.278 Kaye essentially agreed 
with the Pizarro court that “[i]f the perpetrator could have come from 
any of several racial groups, looking to only one racial group for a 
random match probability could be misleading.”279 He expressed grave 
concern, however, over the court’s conclusion that “giving a range of 
frequencies for the major racial or ethnic groups in the United States 
[was therefore] unacceptable.”280 Kaye noted, “Since providing statistics 
from several racial groups is the standard way of assessing the 
significance of a match in cases in which the racial and ethnic status of 
the perpetrator of the crime initially is unknown, the opinion [in Pizarro] 
casts doubt on the outcomes of innumerable cases.”281 Kaye disputed 
what he saw as the court’s presentation of an “unbridgeable gap between 
scientific and legal reasoning in this situation,”282 asserting that  
the scientific reasoning that the court questioned is nothing less than the kind of 
hypothesis testing—considering the principal alternatives and examining the 
probability of certain outcomes under each of these alternative hypotheses— 
that dominates modern statistical thinking. In this instance, the DNA expert 
simply testifies to how surprising the match would be if some major 
alternatives to the hypothesis that the defendant is the source of the biological 
samples were true.283  
Kaye concluded that, with respect to considerations of logical 
relevance, “it is difficult to conceive of any substantive difference 
between legal and scientific reasoning.”284 In the abstract, there is much 
merit to Kaye’s argument. But in declaring no difference between 
scientific and legal reasoning, he obscured the distinction between 
scientific and legal relevance.  
When noting that a perpetrator may “share the defendant’s race 
or ethnicity” Kaye conflates race and genetics by referring to a 
defendant’s “genetic heritage.”285 The concept of “sharing” is very 
peculiar and particular here. Pizarro involved someone who Kaye and 
the court define as “half Hispanic” and “half Caucasian”—implicitly 
making these two categories mutually exclusive. Yet in social practice 
this makes no sense and reinforces the idea of genetically distinct and 
bound “races” rather than continuums of variable “mixes.” Michael 
Pizarro could not be allowed to be a “Hispanic Caucasian” because the 
databases are not constructed that way. Two suspects may “share” the 
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same race, but that “race” itself must be singular and unmixed—not 
“shared” with other races, but rather capable of being broken down into 
parts “half x” and “half y.” In short, the entire model of using race to 
improve probability estimates depends on keeping genetic databases 
segregated by race. The segregation in turn produces RMPs.   
Kaye correctly noted that there was no necessary presumption 
made about a perpetrator’s identity if the suspect’s DNA was compared 
to an array of racial databases of populations to which the perpetrator 
might belong.286 He therefore adequately addressed and effectively 
undermined two of the Pizarro court’s three permissible options for the 
presentation of profile frequencies: “(1) establish that the perpetrator 
more likely than not belongs to a particular ethnic population, then 
present only the frequency in that particular ethnic population; [and] (2) 
present only the most conservative frequency, without mention of 
ethnicity . . . .”287 Kaye’s logic, however, was based on a presumption 
that race itself remained relevant in the calculation of RMPs. Thus, it 
failed to address the third option to “present the frequency in the general, 
non-ethnic population.”288    
In the 2006 case of People v. Wilson, the California Supreme 
Court embraced Kaye’s arguments to disapprove of the reasoning in 
Pizarro and re-validate the calculation of RMPs using race-specific 
databases even when the race of the perpetrator is not otherwise 
known.289 In reaching its conclusions, the court asserted that “[t]he 
question here revolves around exactly what is the relevant population. 
The question is complicated by the fact that the odds vary with different 
racial and ethnic groups. Because of this variation, separate databases are 
maintained for different population groups, and the odds for each group 
are calculated separately.”290 The court then agreed with the lower court’s 
finding that “[w]hen the perpetrator’s race is unknown, the frequencies 
with which the matched profile occurs in various racial groups to which 
the perpetrator might belong are relevant for the purpose of ascertaining 
the rarity of the profile.”291 This effectively overturned Pizarro and 
reinstated the practice of using racially marked databases to generate 
profile frequencies. 
VI.  RACE, GENES, AND RELEVANCE 
Considered in light of the above discussion, it is now clear that 
the use of race in generating RMPs for forensic DNA matches should be 
deemed inadmissible by courts as neither relevant nor reliable. The 
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Supreme Court notably articulated a “gatekeeping” role for the trial court 
judge in considering the admissibility of scientific evidence in the 1993 
case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.292 Central to the 
holding in Daubert was the Court’s articulation of a requirement that the 
trial judge ensure that “an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable 
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”293  
A.  When Race Is Not Relevant 
Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 401 states that “‘[r]elevant 
evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”294 
Clearly forensic DNA evidence is often relevant to a criminal 
proceeding. RMPs generated through reference to a population database 
are therefore also often relevant. A central argument of this Article, 
however, is that in the presentation of such RMPs, race is not relevant. 
Race does not add information that has “any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.”295  
Taking the Wilson case as a paradigmatic example of how race is 
used in the presentation of forensic DNA evidence, we can see that 
central to the court’s decision were the assumptions it brought to bear 
regarding the relevance of race in producing DNA evidence. Following 
the lower court’s assertion that racial data is relevant,296 the court made 
the relatively straightforward assertion that “[r]elevant evidence is 
evidence ‘having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any 
disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action.’”297 The court went on to note that “[t]he test of relevance is 
whether the evidence tends, ‘logically, naturally, and by reasonable 
inference’ to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or 
motive.”298 These are basic rules of evidence and consistent with the FRE 
401 concept of relevance. The court, however, framed the question of 
relevance in terms of “what is the relevant population” rather than 
considering whether differentiation among populations itself provided 
any legally relevant data.299 In Wilson’s case, and in most cases using 
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current techniques of forensic DNA analysis, the answer to this latter 
question should simply be no. 
The RMPs at issue in Wilson ranged from “one of 96 billion 
Caucasians, one of 180 billion Hispanics, and one of 340 billion African-
Americans.”300 The court accepted this racially marked data as relevant 
because forensic scientists had identified statistically significant variation 
in frequencies when using different racial reference populations to 
generate RMPs.301 The court went on to quote approvingly Professor 
Kaye’s assertion that, “[c]ontrary to the Pizarro court’s assertions, in a 
‘general population case’—one in which the investigation cannot be 
limited to a particular racial group—the statistics for a range of groups 
surely are relevant.”302 Kaye made the apparently reasonable point that 
having more data about RMPs for a range of populations would “surely” 
aid a jury in establishing a material fact, such as identity.303 And indeed, 
the court concluded that “[i]t is relevant for the jury to know that most 
persons of at least major portions of the general population could not 
have left the evidence samples.”304 
But forensic (and other) scientists have also repeatedly made the 
point that once a particular odds threshold is passed, any difference 
among profile frequencies is of little or no practical significance.305 As 
the court noted in the 1999 Soto case, Yale geneticist Kenneth Kidd had 
provided support for the conclusion that “any difference in estimates 
over one in a million was pragmatically meaningless.”306 Moreover, as 
the Wilson court explained based on its understanding of Nicola Shea’s 
testimony, “[w]hen nine genetic markers are used in the analysis, the 
result would be a pretty discriminating number no matter what 
population data base was used.”307 Yet at no point did the court consider 
the logical implication of Shea’s statement—that under such 
circumstances, using racially marked databases to generate RMPs added 
nothing to the ability of the jury to make determination of guilt or 
innocence. The difference between one in 96 billion and one in 340 
billion simply does not “hav[e] any tendency in reason to prove or 
disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action.”308 Such information provides nothing of use to the finder of 
fact that would not already be available by using a general non-racially 
marked reference population, which would have generated similarly 
powerful RMPs. In other words, where experts can generate such 
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astronomically low RMPs, race simply is irrelevant and should not play 
a role in the presentation of DNA evidence. 
Several other statements by prominent forensic DNA experts 
further highlight the glaring irrelevance of race for presenting DNA 
evidence given the power of current technology. Arguing in 1996 for the 
adequacy of using broad racial databases to generate RMPs, the FBI’s 
own Bruce Budowle and Keith Monson noted that “[a] profile would be 
considered rare whether it has an estimated frequency of 1/5,000,000, 
1/50,000,000, or 1/500,000,000. Obviously, the difference in the rarity of 
such estimates would have little consequence in a forensic context.”309 
More to the point, Budowle and Eric Lander, in their highly influential 
1994 Nature article on forensic DNA technology, argued that a 
distinction in population frequency between “10-5 or 10-7” was 
“irrelevant for courtroom use.”310 The distinction in population 
frequencies across the diverse race-specific RMPs generated in Wilson 
(roughly between 10-11 and 3.4 x 10-11) was far smaller than that cited by 
Budowle and Lander as irrelevant. Given that current techniques 
regularly generate RMPs in the range of 10-11 (1 in 1,000,000,000,000)311 
across diverse racial databases, any distinction among race-specific 
RMPs must be understood as similarly of “little consequence in a 
forensic context”312 and hence “irrelevant for courtroom use.”313 In 
forensic contexts, the only thing that race adds to RMPs is race itself. It 
provides no additional information that is relevant to aiding the finder of 
fact to resolve any material issue at trial.  
B.  When Race Is Not Reliable 
The requirement that scientific evidence be “reliable” is typically 
discussed in terms of the following factors set forth in Daubert: (1) 
whether the technique or theory underlying the evidence has been 
tested;314 (2) whether “[it] has been subject[] to peer review and 
publication;”315 (3) “the known or potential rate of error” of the technique 
or theory when applied;316 (4) “the existence and maintenance of 
standards [or] control[s];”317 and (5) whether the technique or theory has 
been generally accepted in the scientific community.318 
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When looking at these factors in relation to the generation and 
presentation of race-specific RMPs for DNA evidence, it is immediately 
clear that factors (1), (2), and (5) have been met. As discussed above, 
over the years, numerous studies have been published in peer reviewed 
journals testing and evaluating the use of race-specific databases to 
generate RMPs.319 Thus, since the inception of forensic DNA evidence, 
the use of race has been standard and generally accepted practice.320 Such 
general acceptance, however, is no longer the sole determining factor in 
assessing the reliability of scientific evidence. When scientific practices 
concerning the use of race in relation to forensic DNA are examined 
more closely, it becomes evident that they fail to meet factors (3) and (4): 
there has been little or no consideration of potential rates of error 
regarding the definition of race and its assignment to particular DNA 
samples, nor are there adequate standards or controls for the definition 
and assignment of racial categories to DNA samples.321 Such lack of 
basic scientific rigor calls into question the reliability of RMPs generated 
using racial categories. 
Specifically, in the context of forensic DNA research, we see 
that the scientists who have developed racialized databases have in effect 
let the concept of “self-identification” supplant the need for any 
scientifically rigorous or coherent rationale for classifying genetic data 
by race. This is apparent in the highly influential article written by 
Budowle et al. in 2001, which has become a primary reference in 
calculating race-specific RMPs.322 Titled CODIS STR Loci Data from 41 
Sample Populations,323 the Budowle article purports to “present[] STR 
allele distribution data on 12 or 13 of the CODIS core STR loci in 
several sampled populations from each of the following major population 
groups: African Americans, U.S. Caucasians, Hispanics, Far East Asians, 
and Native Americans.”324 This distribution data was derived from 
samples provided by twenty laboratories distributed widely across the 
U.S., Canada, the Caribbean, and Mexico.325  
Like the Vallone et al. article discussed above,326 the Budowle 
article takes care to specify the technical laboratory instruments and 
practices used to analyze the samples.327 But with regard to race, 
Budowle et al. fall below even the Vallone et al. article’s meager 
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reference to self-identification328 and provide absolutely no information 
on how or by whom racial identity was ascribed to these samples. Most 
of the samples came from law enforcement agencies.329 Self-
identification may have been used, but it is also quite likely that law 
enforcement authorities themselves ascribed racial identities to the 
samples.  
In an article on the ethical, legal, and social implication of 
forensic DNA analysis, Mildred Cho and Pamela Sankar discuss at 
length a British study showing that external ascriptions of racial identity 
by law enforcement authorities correspond very poorly with underlying 
patterns of genetic variation.330 The article notes that in the British study, 
“[c]lassifications into the five ‘ethnic’ groups [Caucasian, Afro-
Caribbean, Indian sub-continental, Southeast Asian, and Middle Eastern] 
were assigned by police officers by visual characteristics, . . . based on 
[perceptions of outward] appearance rather than any knowledge of an 
individual’s ancestry.”331 The actual correspondence of these external 
ascriptions to the “true” ancestry of the individuals ranged from 30% for 
the Middle Eastern category up to 67% for Afro-Caribbean, with 
Caucasian falling at 56%.332 In other words, if the samples providing the 
basis for the Budowle article were classified based on external 
ascriptions of race by law enforcement authorities, it would not be 
unreasonable to suppose that somewhere around 50% of the 
classifications were inaccurate in terms of their relation to genetically 
based ancestral origins. If this is the case, it calls into question the 
legitimacy of any RMPs derived from these reference populations. 
Perhaps the samples provided to Budowle were classified by 
self-identification. This, however, would not solve the problem. Self-
identification is a social, not genetic, practice.333 Moreover, as Cho and 
Sankar note, “individual self-classification is not stable; for example, one 
US study found that one-third of people change their own self-identified 
race or ethnicity in two consecutive years.”334 Complicating matters still 
further, a recent study by Condit et al. found people often have very 
“incomplete knowledge of their [biological] ancestry.”335 Among the 
subjects interviewed for a study on attitudes toward race-based 
pharmacogenomics (the tailoring of drugs to genetic profiles), Condit 
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found that “39.6% did not know all four of their [biological] 
grandparents.”336 In such situations, self-declared race may fail to capture 
significant variations in biological ancestry. 
This lack of care given to the meaning and attribution of race in 
a genetic context contrasts markedly with the obvious scientific rigor 
applied to the elaboration of the more technical aspects concerning the 
extraction, amplification, and analysis of forensic DNA samples.337 
Clearly, the general practice of using forensic DNA to help identify 
criminal suspects meets all the Daubert standards of reliability. It is only 
with respect to the handling of race that the reliability of particular RMPs 
should be called into question. The use of a general reference population 
to generate RMPs without regard to race would directly overcome this 
lack of reliability.  
C.  Race, Genes, and Prejudice 
Even if race-specific RMPs were deemed somehow relevant and 
reliable, they should still be excluded as unduly prejudicial. FRE 403 
states,  
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.338 
The probative value of race-specific RMPs must be evaluated in 
relation to the alternative probative value of non-race-specific RMPs. As 
noted above,339 Yale geneticist Kenneth Kidd testified in People v. Soto 
that once the odds threshold of one in one million was crossed, any 
further differentiation among RMPs was what the court called 
“pragmatically meaningless.”340 Similarly, the FBI’s Bruce Budowle and 
Keith Monson discussed the difference between odds of 1 in 5,000,000 
and 1 in 500,000,000 as of little or no forensic significance.341 Since 
current technology can use non-racial general reference populations to 
regularly generate RMPs far in excess of 1 in 5,000,000 (and even in 
excess of 1 in 500,000,000), the probative value of any refinement of the 
odds provided by the addition of race-specific RMPs, even if relevant, 
should be deemed de minimis. 
What concerns for prejudice should then be balanced in the 
scales against this de minimis relevance? The dangers of racial bias 
  
 
336
 Id. at 388. The two reported studies had population sizes of 104 and 120 participants. 
Id. at 385. 
 
337
 See supra Part IV.A. 
 
338
 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 
339
 See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
 
340
 People v. Soto, 981 P.2d 958, 973 (Cal. 1999). 
 
341
 See Budowle & Monson, supra note 309. 
2009] REFORMING DNA EVIDENCE 371 
 
tainting the evaluation of forensic evidence should be of paramount 
concern in this context. DNA evidence is usually presented in cases of 
violent crimes, often of the most heinous variety.342 Where race is 
gratuitously injected into the context of violent crime and genetics is 
added to the mix, the danger of creating stigmatizing racial stereotypes 
by conflating race, violence, and genes343 should be deemed to outweigh 
any de minimis probative value provided by race-specific RMPs. 
Concern to ensure that racial prejudice does not infect the justice 
system must be primary in any evaluation of the admissibility of forensic 
DNA evidence. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in McCleskey v. Kemp, 
“[b]ecause of the risk that the factor of race may enter the criminal 
justice process, we have engaged in unceasing efforts to eradicate racial 
prejudice from our criminal justice system.”344 Thus, for example, the 
prosecution may not challenge a juror on the basis of race;345 a change of 
venue may be constitutionally required as a result of widespread bias in a 
community;346 and the prosecution is barred from appealing to racial 
prejudice in its argument to the jury.347 
In their treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure, Wright and 
Graham note that “any reference to race by prosecutor must be justified 
by compelling state interest.”348 They caution, in particular, that “[w]hile 
many jurors would reject crude appeals to prejudice, more sophisticated 
forms of this technique may not be recognized as such. Today the appeal 
to prejudice is apt to be disguised as some form of science.”349 With 
specific reference to FRE 403, they conclude that  
fairness in adjudication does not consist entirely in the accuracy of the factual 
determinations but may require some sacrifice of accuracy to avoid the 
suspicion that the decision rests on prejudice disguised as science. Therefore, 
the party who asserts a major premise based on one of the suspect 
classifications must expect that his premise will be more rigorously scrutinized 
than is typical in rulings on relevance.350 
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Thus far, the use of race in the presentation of forensic DNA 
evidence has received virtually no scrutiny from courts in terms of the 
value or lack thereof that race adds to the accuracy of the RMPs thus 
generated. Wright and Graham allow that some measure of accuracy may 
need to be sacrificed to avoid the suspicion of racial prejudice.351 In the 
case of presenting RMPs without regard to race, such a sacrifice would 
be negligible. 
Wright and Graham’s reference to the distinctive power of 
science to disguise appeals to prejudice352 is especially apt in the context 
of forensic DNA evidence. In a study of mock jurors, Jonathan Koehler 
found that “the way in which DNA match statistics are framed and 
presented to legal fact finders may affect how they think about and use 
the DNA evidence.”353 Koehler’s study looked only at different 
probabilistic frames for presenting the same statistic,354 but it is important 
to consider that similar subtle psychological dynamics may be at work in 
the framing of RMPs in terms of race.  
Sheri Lynn Johnson has argued that the use of negative racial 
stereotypes pervades the presentation of criminal cases to juries.355 She 
argues that “[i]f the entire body of relevant data is surveyed, the 
inference that race influences many white jurors’ determinations of guilt 
is unavoidable.”356 In their recent article, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations,357 Anthony Greenwald and Linda Krieger discuss the 
“science of implicit cognition,” which “suggests that actors do not 
always have conscious, intentional control over the processes of social 
perception, impression formation, and judgment that motivate their 
actions.”358 They define “implicit biases” as “discriminatory biases based 
on implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes.”359 Being implicit, such 
biases are not conscious—yet they are significant. They note that 
[i]mplicit biases are especially intriguing, and also especially problematic, 
because they can produce behavior that diverges from a person’s avowed or 
endorsed beliefs or principles. The very existence of implicit bias poses a 
challenge to legal theory and practice, because discrimination doctrine is 
premised on the assumption that, barring insanity or mental incompetence, 
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human actors are guided by their avowed (explicit) beliefs, attitudes, and 
intentions.360 
Greenwald and Krieger go on to review data from the “Implicit 
Association Test,” which is widely used to “assess[] implicit attitudes 
toward African Americans[] relative to European Americans[].”361 They 
observe that researchers have consistently found what they describe as 
“implicit attitudinal preference” for European Americans over African 
Americans.362 They conclude that “a substantial and actively 
accumulating body of research evidence establishes that implicit race 
bias is pervasive and is associated with discrimination against African 
Americans.”363 To the extent that such implicit race bias might already be 
present among average jurors, injecting race into the presentation of 
forensic DNA evidence presents a significant danger of tainting the 
proceedings with unfair prejudice. 
This danger is heightened by the pervasive association of race 
and violent crime in the public mind.364 For example, John Hurwitz and 
Mark Peffley argue that since the infamous “Willie Horton” ad run by 
the National Security Political Action Committee (NSPAC) against 
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Democrat Michael Dukakis during the 1988 presidential campaign, 
subtly associating race and crime has been a staple of modern politics.365 
In that spot,  
the narrator [notes] . . . that Willie Horton, a convicted murderer, received 
multiple weekend furlough passes from prison, during the last of which, the 
narrator informs us, he “fled, kidnapping a young couple, stabbing the man and 
repeatedly raping his girlfriend.” While the ad could have conveyed exactly the 
same information without graphics, NSPAC elected to superimpose the most 
menacing possible picture of Horton, an African American, over the 
narrative.366  
Hurwitz and Peffley go on to note that the ad was particularly effective 
because of its “implicitness,” which allowed White Americans to 
internalize the association of African-Americans and violent crime 
without directly challenging their conscious commitments to “norm[s] of 
[racial] equality.”367 Professor of Theology Ted Peters further cautions 
that “[i]f we identify crime with genes and then genes with race, then we 
may inadvertently provide a biological support for prejudice and 
discrimination.”368 
Taken together, the presence of racial imagery in criminal trials, 
the psychological dynamics of implicit prejudice, and the prominent 
association of race and violent crime in the public mind all counsel 
strongly against the unnecessary introduction of race into the 
presentation of forensic DNA evidence. More specifically, the dangers 
they present of infecting criminal proceedings with racial bias clearly 
outweigh the minimal probative value provided by the use of race-
specific RMPs. Thus, even if courts deem race-specific RMPs to be 
relevant, they should nonetheless exclude such evidence as unduly 
prejudicial. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Race has been present in forensic DNA evidence since its 
inception. Over the past twenty years, the use of race-specific RMPs has 
become a normative, routine, and largely unquestioned practice. 
Whatever justifications may have originally been proffered for this 
practice have long since been superseded by basic technological 
developments that allow for the calculation of extremely powerful RMPs 
without reference to race. In relation to the presentation of forensic DNA 
evidence to juries, race is simply a concept whose time has passed. Race-
specific RMPs provide little or no relevant information to finders of fact. 
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They present a significant danger of unfairly prejudicing deliberations 
through the gratuitous association of race with genetics and violent 
crime. Ending the practice of generating race-specific RMPs will not 
materially impede the ability of law enforcement to obtain convictions 
using DNA evidence. Forensic experts will still be able to regularly 
generate astronomically low RMPs (often with denominators far in 
excess of the world’s population) using a non-differentiated general 
reference population. Defendants will not be disadvantaged because 
race-specific RMPs will only be excluded when they add nothing of 
substance to the finder of fact’s ability to make an informed judgment 
regarding the DNA evidence. Thus, there is no legal or practical 
justification for the continued presentation of forensic DNA evidence in 
terms of race. The practice can and should be ended. It should be 
replaced with the use of non-racial general population databases to 
generate RMPs. Indeed, David Kaye has recently noted that such an 
approach, while statistically more complex than using the current racially 
differentiated databases, is certainly technically feasible.369  
Given current technical ability to generate minuscule RMPs, 
even using a general population base, these recommendations may not 
change the specific outcomes of individual cases. They will, however, 
affect larger issues of how the criminal justice system is implicated in 
constructing, perpetuating, or deepening broader racialized 
understandings of the relations among race, genetics, and violent crime. 
By eliminating at least one powerful site for the improper use of genetics 
as a prism through which to view race and crime, these recommendations 
aim to take a step toward developing a more appropriate understanding 
of the complex relations among race, genes, and justice. 
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